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Articles
Network Accountability for the
Domestic Intelligence Apparatus
DANIELLE KEATS CITRON AND FRANK PASQUALE*

A new domestic intelligencenetwork has made vast amounts of data available to federal
and state agencies and law enforcement officials. The network is anchored by "fiusion
centers," novel sites of intergovernmental collaboration that generate and share
intelligence and information. Several fusion centers have generated controversy for
engaging in extraordinary measures that place citizens on watch lists, invade citizens'
privacy, and chill free expression. In addition to eroding civil liberties, fusion center
overreachhas resulted in wasted resourceswithout concomitantgains in security.
While many scholars have assumed that this network represents a trade-off between
security and civil liberties, our study of fusion centers suggests these goals are, in fact,
mutually reinforcing. Too often, fusion centers' structure has been based on clever legal
strategiesfor avoiding extant strictures on information sharing, ratherthan on objective
analysis of terror threats. The "information sharing environment" created by fusion
centers has short-circuited traditional modes of agency accountability. Our twentiethcentury model of agency accountability cannot meaningfully address twenty-first-century
agency coordination.
A new concept of accountability- "network accountability"-is needed to address the
shortcomings of fusion centers. Network accountability has technical, legal, and
institutionaldimensions. Technical standardscan render data exchange between agencies
in the network better subject to review. Legal redress mechanisms can speed the
correction of inaccurate or inappropriateinformation. A robust strategy is necessary to
institutionalize these aspects of network accountability.
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workshops for their insightful comments. Ovais Anwar, Mariestela Bustay, Matt Haven, Alice
Johnson, Margot Kaminski, Geoff Kravitz, Lindsey Lanzendorfer, David Martin, Susan McCarty,
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INTRODUCTION

the 9/11 attacks, U.S. law enforcement and
intelligence agencies scrambled to reassess terror threats. Congress and
President Bush broke down ossified bureaucratic structures that
In

the wake

of

previously impeded intelligence efforts. They created a new Department

of Homeland Security (DHS) and eliminated "walls" between agencies
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to encourage them to cooperate on counter-terror missions.' Yet one
popular proposal for securing the homeland was never formally
implemented: The U.S. never established its own domestic intelligence
agency' akin to Britain's MI-5. 3 Bureaucratic in-fighting, and fear of a
civil liberties firestorm, prevented the founding of an agency designed to
conduct surveillance on Americans.'
Nevertheless, domestic intelligence is daily generated and shared.'
Federal agencies, including the DHS, gather information in conjunction
with state and local law enforcement officials in what Congress has
deemed the "information sharing environment" ("ISE").6 The ISE is
essentially a network, with hubs known as "fusion centers" whose federal
and state analysts gather and share data and intelligence on a wide range
of threats.
The network's architects have assured congressional panels,
journalists, and concerned citizens that interagency communications
accord with relevant laws and that information gathering is targeted and
focused.' They claim that fusion centers raise few new privacy concerns,
and that any privacy problems are well in hand.9 They reason that any

i. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub L. No. 107-296, H§ 111-113, II6 Stat. 2135, 2142-45
(codified at 6 U.S.C. H§II1-113 (2006)) (establishing the DHS); Nathan Sales, Share and Share Alike:
Intelligence Agencies and Information Sharing, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 279, 280 (2009) ("[T]he

consensus in favor of more information sharing has proven surprisingly broad and durable.").
Although hard to say at the time of printing, the Wikileaks scandal that broke in late 2010 could have
had an impact on the information-sharing imperative.
2. Matthew C. Waxman, Police and National Security: American Local Law Enforcement and
CounterterrorismAfter 9/I, 3 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 377, 405-07 (2009) (describing the lack of a

"dedicated domestic intelligence service" in the U.S.).
3. Many nations have domestic intelligence agencies, including France, Israel, Germany, Japan,
Australia, New Zealand, India, South Africa, and Canada. RICHARD A. POSNER, REMAKING DOMESTIC

INTELLIGENCE 3 (2005) (noting that "the weakest link in the U.S. intelligence system" is domestic
intelligence, as compared to countries outside the U.S. that have such agencies).
4. Waxman, supra note 2, at 405.

5. Thomas Cincotta, Intelligence Fusion Centers:A De-CentralizedNationalIntelligence Agency,
PUBLIC EYE (Winter 2009/Spring 2oo), http://www.publiceye.org/magazine/v24n4/intelligence-fusioncenters.html ("This network constitutes a nascent de facto national intelligence agency, whose
decentralized structure diminishes transparency and accountability. Without effective oversight, a
narrowly defined mission, and new legal structures, the capacity of fusion centers to undermine
fundamental freedoms could grow unchecked.").
6. Implementing Recommendations of the 9/I1 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-53,

§ 511, 121 Stat. 266, 322 (2007); Intelligence Reform & Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-458, § ios6, 118 Stat. 3638, 3665 (2004).
7. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEc., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURrTY STATE, LOCAL, AND REGIONAL FusIoN CENTER INITIATIVE 19-21 (2008) [hereinafter
PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT].
8. Id. at 18, 20-31 (explaining that the fusion center initiative "will not change" the way
information is sent to and received from the DHS and "is not intended to create new channels for
information exchange or new Federal systems").
9. Id. at 31 (describing the DHS Privacy Office's efforts to provide training to fusion center
personnel regarding their knowledge of Fair Information Practice Principles and "responsibilities to
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given fusion center employee must simply follow the privacy and civil
liberties policy of his or her employer-be it a local, state, or national
agency."o DHS and local fusion center leaders claim their network only
menaces criminals and terrorists, not ordinary citizens."
Unfortunately, a critical mass of abuses and failures at fusion
centers over the past few years makes it impossible to accept these
assurances at face value. Fusion centers facilitate a domestic intelligence
network that collapses traditional distinctions between law enforcement
and foreign wars, between federal and state authorities, and between
government surveillance and corporate data practices. By operating at
the seams of state and federal laws, they circumvent traditional
accountability measures. Inadequate oversight of fusion centers has led
to significant infringements on civil liberties. Years after they were
initiated, advocates of fusion centers have failed to give more than a
cursory account of the benefits they provide.
Were fusion center abuses consistently associated with anti-terror
accomplishments, the new ISE might pose a tragic, yet necessary, choice
between security and liberty. However, a critical mass of cases, explored
in detail in Part I, suggests that the lack of oversight of fusion centers is
both eroding civil liberties and wasting resources.
Consider two recent cases. In 2008, Minnesota law enforcement,
working with the state's fusion center, engaged in intelligence-led
policing to identify potential threats to the upcoming Republican
National Convention ("RNC"). Police deployed infiltrators to report on
political groups and tapped into various groups' information exchanges.
The fusion center spent more than looo hours analyzing potential threats
to the RNC. 4 A fusion center report, distributed to more than 1300 law
enforcement officers, identified bottled water, first-aid supplies,
computers, and pamphlets as potential evidence of threats." Another
report warned law enforcement that demonstrators would "collect and
stockpile items at various locations .... Anything that seems out of place
protect individual privacy," and noting their commitment to update their Privacy Impact Assessment
when new privacy challenges arise).
1o. Id. at 26-27 ("Federal employees assigned to fusion centers are subject to the Privacy Act of
1974, and are responsible for adhering to their Agency's privacy policies.... State and local
employees, on the other hand, are responsible for adhering to their own State laws and policies,
including those relating to the protections of individual privacy.").
ii. Id.

12. G.W. Schulz, Assessing RNC Police Tactics: Missteps, Poor Judgments, and Inappropriate
Detentions, MINNPosT.coM (Sept. 1, 2009), http://www.minnpost.com/stories/2oo9/o9/ol/riI98/
assessingrnc-police-tacticsmissteps-poor-judgments and inappropriate detentions.

13. Id.
14. Id.

15. G.W. Schulz, Looking Back at GOP Convention: Police Kicked into 'Disruption
Mode', MINNPosT.coM (Sept. 2, 2009), http://www.minnpost.com/stories/2oo9/o9/o2/II256/
looking-back.at-gop-convention-police-kicked into disruption mode.
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for its location could indicate the stockpiling of supplies to be used
against first responders." 6
Because the fusion center had advised police to be on the lookout
for feces and urine that protestors might attempt to throw during clashes
on the street, police pulled over a bus after noticing that it contained two
five-gallon buckets in the rear." What they found was chicken feed, not
feces.' 8 Days later, at the convention, police arrested 8oo people: Most of
the charges were dropped or downgraded once prosecutors reviewed the
police allegations and activity." Ginned up to confront a phantom terror
threat, the fusion center-led operations did little more than disrupt a
peaceful political protest.
Fusion center overreach is not limited to Minnesota or notable
events like those involving RNC. Over a nineteen-month period in 2004
and 2005, Maryland state police conducted surveillance of human rights
groups, peace activists, and death penalty opponents.o As a result, fiftythree nonviolent political activists were classified as "terrorists,"
including two Catholic nuns and a Democratic candidate for local
office." A Maryland fusion center shared the erroneous terrorist
classifications with federal drug enforcement and terrorist databases, as
well as with the National Security Administration (NSA)."
The ISE has yet to provide a systematic redress mechanism to
remove misinformation from databases spread throughout the
networked environment or to address the stigma that can result from
misclassifications. Had the ACLU of Maryland not fortuitously
discovered the fusion center's activities in connection with an open
records request, the political activists might have remained on these
watch lists. In response to these and other similar incidents, Bruce Fein,
an associate deputy attorney general under Ronald Reagan, argued that
fusion centers conceive the business of gathering and sharing intelligence
as "synonymous with monitoring and disparaging political dissent and
association protected by the First Amendment."23 A fusion center official
confirmed Fein's concern by noting:
16. Id.
17. Id.
i8. Id.
19. Id.

2o. Nick Madigan, Spying Uncovered, BALT. SUN, July 18, 2oo8, at iA, available at
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bal-te.md.spyi8juli8,o,5659230.story.
21. Id.; Lisa Rein, Police Spied on Activists in Maryland, WASH. POST, July I8, 2008, at AI;
Matthew Harwood, Maryland State Police Spied on Nonviolent Activists and Labeled Them Terrorists,
sECURrrY MGMT. (Oct. 8, 2oo8), http://www.securitymanagement.com/news/maryland-state-policespied-nonviolent-activists-and-labeled-them-terrorists-o04742.
22. Id.

23. The Futureof Fusion Centers: PotentialPromise and Dangers: Hearing Before Subcomm. on
Intelligence, Info. Sharing,and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., i iith
Cong. 42 (2009) [hereinafter Future of Fusion Centers Hearing] (statement of Bruce Fein, Principal,
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You can make an easy kind of a link that, if you have a protest group
protesting a war where the cause that's being fought against is
international terrorism, you might have terrorism at that protest. You
can almost argue that a protest against [the war] is a terrorist act.2 4
If a domestic intelligence agency conducted such outrageous
surveillance of innocent political activists, ordinary institutions of
oversight familiar from administrative law-such as judicial review and
cost-benefit analysis-could directly address the problem." Yet
misdirected surveillance remains a concern, because it is unclear who
exactly is responsible for these abuses-state and local police or federal
funders of fusion centers? The structure of the ISE poses important new
challenges to administrative law, a body of law built to address actions of
individual agencies rather than the interactions of a network of agencies.
Since it focuses on individual agencies, traditional administrative law is
ill-equipped to assure a network's accountability.
Participants in fusion centers have often attempted to shift blame
for their shortcomings. DHS officials insist that state and local authorities
are ultimately responsible for fusion center activities, even as they
,6
distribute grants and guidelines that shape fusion center activity. As
state and municipal budgets contract due to declining tax revenues and
fiscal retrenchment, local officials may feel pressed to feed information
and find threats in order to maintain the flow of federal funding.
There are many reasons to worry about the types of influence and
information exchange this relationship betokens. Unlike centralized
programs to which the privacy and civil liberties community could
rapidly respond, fusion centers are diffuse and difficult to monitor. More
a network than an institution, fusion centers have so far evaded oversight
from watchdogs focused on traditional law enforcement institutions."
This Article examines the new ISE, in which privacy invasions,
chilled speech, and costly distractions from core intelligence missions
increasingly emanate from dysfunctional transactions within networks of
agencies rather than from any particular entity acting unilaterally. We
argue that basic administrative law principles of due process should apply
just as forcefully to agency interactions as they do to agency actions.
Certain exchanges of information between agencies should be monitored,
even in a general environment of openness and collaboration.

The Litchfield Grp.).
24. David E. Kaplan, Spies Among Us, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 30, 2006),
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/o6o5o8/8homeland.htm (alteration in original) (emphasis
added) (quoting Mike Van Winkle) (internal quotation marks omitted).
25. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. H 701-703 (2oo6); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed.
Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).

26.

JOHN ROLLINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,

CONGRESS 40-42

RL

34070, FUSION CENTERS: ISSUES AND OrnONS FOR

(2oo8).

27. MICHAEL GERMAN & JAY STANLEY,

ACLU,

WHAT'S WRONG WITH FUSION CENTERS? 10

(2007).
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The argument proceeds as follows: Part I offers a comprehensive
description of fusion centers, based on a wide range of primary and
secondary sources and litigation materials. Part II critiques the current
operations of fusion centers, concluding that the centers have eroded
privacy and civil liberties without concomitant gains in security.
Fortunately, officials at the DHS (the main agency funding fusion
centers) have begun to realize the scope of these problems, as we
describe in Part III.A. They are even beginning to recognize one of the
central arguments of this piece: that liberty and security are mutually
reinforcing, because nearly all the problematic abuses at fusion centers
are distractions from their central anti-crime and anti-terror missions.
However, there are still critical shortcomings in DHS oversight of fusion
centers, as we demonstrate in III.B: The agency is trying to apply a
twentieth-century model of agency accountability to twenty-first-century
interagency coordination.
The solution, we argue in Part IV, is network accountability:
technical and legal standards that render interactions between the parts
of the ISE subject to review and correction." We advance protocols for
auditing fusion center activities, including "write-once, read-many"
technology and data integrity standards. Legal redress mechanisms for
inaccurate or inappropriate targeting can be built on this foundation of
data.
Finally, in Part V, we promote standards of interagency governance
designed to hold the ISE accountable. Without objective performance
standards, fusion centers may consume an ever larger share of our
security and law enforcement budget without demonstrating their worth.
Advances in interagency governance in other fields suggest new paths for
network accountability in the context of fusion centers.
As they are presently run, fusion centers all but guarantee further
inclusion of innocents on watch lists and wasteful investigation of
activists with no connections to crime or terrorism." Fusion centers'
actions inconvenience both civilians and law enforcers, unfairly tarnish
reputations, and deter legitimate dissent. In this Article, we propose a
framework for identifying and preventing future abuses. Principles of
open government inform our analysis throughout. A policy of de facto
total information awareness by the government should be complemented
28. Network-based metaphors help clarify forms of association enabled by new communication
and data storage technologies. We discuss fusion centers as both network organizations and hubs of
associative clusters. For a definition of these terms, see MILTON MUELLER, NETWORKS AND STATES:
GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE 41 (2010) (defining a network organization as "a loose but
bounded and consciously constructed organization based mainly on leveraging the benefits of
reciprocity," and an associative cluster as "an unbounded and decentered cluster of actors around
repeated patterns of exchange or contact").
29. For an insightful analysis of the general problem of watch lists, see Peter M. Shane, The
BureaucraticDue Processof Government Watch Lists, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 804 (2007).
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by increasing accountability- specifically, the network accountability we
define and defend in this Article.
I.

DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE PARTNERSHIPS: FUSION CENTERS AND
BEYOND

After 9/11, policymakers argued that government agencies could
have prevented the attacks if they had "connected the dots" by
synthesizing and analyzing available information.o Accused of
incompetence, officials defended themselves by arguing that law
prevented cooperation among domestic law enforcement officials and
military and foreign intelligence personnel.3 ' in response, Congress
established an "information sharing environment" that would anticipate
threats and improve the exchange of "terrorism information" among all
levels of government, tribal entities, and the private sector."
To orchestrate the ISE, the Department of Homeland Security,
along with the Department of Justice (DOJ), coordinates with state,
local, and regional fusion centers to share, access, and collaborate on
terrorism-related information." According to DHS Secretary Janet
Napolitano, fusion centers play a crucial role in "analyzing
intelligence .. . sharing information, getting information out, and receiving
information from" the public and private sectors.34 This Part describes
the central role that fusion centers play in our domestic surveillance
apparatus.

30. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: INFORMATION SHARING
STRATEGY 3 (2oo8); see also MARKLE FOUND., PROTECTING AMERICA'S FREEDOM IN THE INFORMATION AGE

75

(2002); NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE

U.S.,

THE 9/1I

COMMISSION REPORT

146

(2004).
31. ERIC LICHTBLAU, BUSH'S LAW: THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 159-60 (2oo8).
32. Implementing Recommendations of the 9/I Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-53,
§ 511, 121 Stat. 266, 322 (2oo7); Intelligence Reform & Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-458, § soi6, 118 Stat. 3638, 3665. See generally TODD MASSE ET AL., EDS., INFORMATION AND
INTELLIGENCE (INCLUDING TERRORISM) FUSION CENTERS 5 (2008) (describing the importance of fusion,
including non-traditional intelligence). For a thoughtful exploration of this shift to an "Information
Sharing Paradigm," see Peter P. Swire, Privacy and Information Sharing in the War on Terrorism,
51 VILL. L. REV. 951,954 (2oo6).
33. BUREAU OF JUSTICE Sys. & GLOBAL JUSTICE INFO. SHARING INITIATIVE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE &
U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., FUSION CENTER PRIVACY POLICY DEVELOPMENT: PRIVACY, CIVIL RIGHTS,
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES POLICY TEMPLATE 3 (2010) [hereinafter FUSION CENTER POLICY TEMPLATE].

34. Trip Jennings, Fusion Centers Key to Efforts to Combat Drug Violence, Officials Say, N.M.
INDEP. (June 5, 2009), http://newmexicoindependent.cOm/28966/fusion-centers-key-to-fed-efforts-atcombating-drug-violence; see also Hilary Hylton, Fusion Centers: Giving Cops Too Much Information?,
TIME (Mar. 9, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/o,8599,1883Ioi,oo.html.

July 2ol111]

A.

NETWORK ACCOUNTABILITY

1449

FUSION CENTER OPERATIONS

State and federal law enforcement rarely shared information and
intelligence before 9/II." Since then, Congress has allocated over $500

million in grants to fusion centers to encourage collaboration. 6 Fusion
centers "co-locate under one roof" representatives of state and federal
agencies to "collect and share" information and intelligence." Although
states and localities run fusion centers, the federal government provides
additional analysts, often from the DHS, the FBI, the National Guard,
and the Coast Guard.3
Private entities have close ties with fusion centers as well. In DHS
Secretary Janet Napolitano's view, private firms "need to be prepared
and trained and co-located" at fusion centers. Increasingly, this has
meant that private firms send employees to work at fusion centers.4 o A
Boeing intelligence analyst, for instance, is employed full-time at the
Washington Joint Analytical Center ("WJAC").4 ' Boeing enjoys "realtime access to information from the fusion centers," while the center
obtains Boeing's "mature intelligence capabilities."" According to a

35. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., CIVIL LIBERTIES IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE STATE, LOCAL,
AND REGIONAL FUSION CENTER INITIATIVE 2 (2oo8) [hereinafter CIVIL LIBERTIES IMPACT ASSESSMENT]

("The 9/11 commission acknowledged the challenge of information sharing between the Federal
government and State and local entities. As a result, many states and municipalities began adopting a
'fusion' center approach . . . .").
36. ROLLINS, supra note 26, at 41-42. The federal government's commitment to fusion centers is
firm: Congress allocated $250 million to "upgrading, modifying, or constructing" state and local fusion
centers in 2olo. Hylton, supra note 34.

37. Tom Monahan, Safeguarding America's Playground, UNLV INST. FOR SEC. STUDIES
(July/Aug. 2oo), http://iss.unlv.edu/Guest%20Clumns/guestcolumn-julyaugust%2020Io.html.
38. See, e.g., MCAC Partners, MD. COORDINATION & ANALYSIS CrR., http://www.mcac-md.gov/
MCACPartners.php (on file with Hastings Law Journal).
39. Janet Napolitano, Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Remarks at the National Fusion Center
Conference (Mar. I1, 2009) (emphasis added), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/speeches/
Sp_1236975404263.shtm.
40. Private firms also help run fusion centers. For instance, a consulting firm manages and
provides analysis for the North Central Texas Fusion System. Bill Baumbach, While the County
Fiddles, Johnson Gets Paid, and Paid, and Paid, COLLIN CNTY. OBSERVER (July 15, 2009),
http://www.baumbach.org/b2eVolution/blogs/index.php/2009/07/15/while-the-county fiddles-johnson
getspa.
41. Alice Lipowicz, Boeing to Staff FBI Fusion Center, WASH. TECH. (June I, 2007),
http://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2o07/o6/o/boeing-to-staff-fbi-fusion-center.aspx. Similarly, the
Illinois Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Fusion Center has a privately funded analyst who focuses
on private-sector security. News Release, ASIS Int'l, ASIS Foundation and Illinois Law Enforcement
Create the First Private-Sector Funded Position for the Illinois Statewide Terrorism and
Intelligence Fusion Center (Apr. 21, 2009), http://www.asisonline.org/newsroom/pressReleases/
o4 2Io 9 _ASISFoundationIllinois.doc.
42. Lipowicz, supra note 41 (quoting Richard Hovel, Senior Advisor on Aviation and Homeland
Sec., Boeing Co.) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Boeing analyst works in the FBI field office
adjoining the WJAC. Id. In a similar vein, California is building an insurance fraud fusion center that
would "strengthen insurers' hands in investigations." See Novel Fusion Center to Boost Anti-Fraud
Efforts in California, FRAUD Focus (Coal. Against Ins. Fraud, Wash., D.C.), Summer 2oo8, at s.
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Boeing executive, the company hopes "to set an example of how private
owners of critical infrastructure can get involved in such centers to
generate and receive criminal and anti-terrorism intelligence."43
Starbucks, Amazon, and Alaska Airlines have expressed interest in
placing analysts at the WJAC.A
B.

CORE FUNCTIONS

Originally conceived as part of the country's anti-terrorism efforts,
fusion centers now typically devote themselves to the detection and
prevention of "all hazards, all crimes, all threats." 45 Their central
functions involve intelligence gathering and information sharing.
Fusion centers produce operational and strategic intelligence. In
their operational role, they generate analyses on particular suspects or
crimes. 47 In their strategic role, fusion centers use predictive data-mining
tools that search datasets to identify crime trends and patterns.#5 For
example, the Dallas fusion center analyzes "vast quantities of
information" to "understand crime patterns and identify individuals and
locations that represent the highest threat to the community." 49

43. Lipowicz, supra note 41. Boeing's decision to co-locate at the WJAC may be due, in part, to
the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 400, which exempts
information that a private firm has provided to the federal government concerning critical
infrastructure from FOIA's disclosure requirements. Lipowicz, supra note 41. This suggests that
Boeing is not only providing intelligence analysis, but also raw information to the WJAC.
44. Rick Anderson, Watching the Protesters: These Spies May Have Known Too Much, (June 9,
20o0), http://www.seattleweekly.com/content/printVersion/997962/; Joseph Straw, Smashing Information
Stovepipes,
SECURITY
MGMT.,
http://www.securitymanagement.comarticle/smashing-intelligencestovepipes?page=o%2Co (last visited July 4, 2011).
45. See, e.g., David L. Carter, CriticalIssues in Civil Rights for Law Enforcement Intelligence and
Counterterrorism,46 CRIM. L. BULL. 587, 591 (2oo) (discussing this approach); Mary Beth Sheridan &
Spencer S. Hsu, Network of Centers Pools Dataon Terror,WASH. PosT, Dec. 31, 2oo6, at A3.
46. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between the Fed. Bureau of Investigation and the
Va. Fusion Ctr. 2 (Feb. 28, 2oo8), availableat http://epic.org/privacy/virginia-fusion/MOU.pdf.
47. Kerry Kester, Delaware Moves to Forefront with Security Technology, CAPE GAZETTE, Apr. 17,

2007 , at 4 (on file with Hastings Law Journal). The Fusion Center Guidelines suggest numerous modes
of intelligence output, such as investigative and tactical response, alerts, geospatial imaging, criminal
backgrounds and profiles, crime-pattern analysis, terrorism calendars, and threat assessments. BUREAU
OF JUSTICE Sys. & GLOBAL JUSTICE INFO. SHARING INITIATIVE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP'T OF
HOMELAND SEC., FUSION CENTER GUIDELINES 57 (2oo6) [hereinafter FUSION CENTER GUIDELINES].

48. Jim McKay, Narrowing the Focus, Gov'T TECH. (Sept. 12, 2007), http://www.govtech.com/
public-safety/Narrowing-the-Focus.html; Monahan, supra note 37; Ryan Paul, Microsoft to Aid in War
on Terror, Builds Software for DHS, ARs TECHNICA (NOV. 21, 2008, 9:19 AM), http://arstechnica.com/
security/news/2oo8/i i/microsoft-to-aid-in-war-on-terror-builds-software-for-dhs.ars.
49. Metro Operations Support & Analytical Intelligence Ctr., Presentation to the Public Safety
Committee: Dallas Police Department Fusion Center Update II (June 15, 2009), available at

http://www.dallascityhall.com/committee-briefings/briefingso6o9/PSFusionCentero615o9.pdf. The
Southern Nevada fusion center's director echoed this sentiment: "Intelligence analysts collect
information from other Fusion Centers from classified and unclassified sources, as well as from the
public, with an eye towards identifying those behaviors and activities that suggest the pre-operational
phases of an impending terror attack." Monahan, supra note 37.
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Fusion centers' guiding principle is "the more data, the better.""o As
fusion center officials note, "There is never ever enough
information.... That's what post-9/Ii is about."' To that end, fusion
centers access public- and private-sector databases of traffic tickets,
property records, identity-theft reports, drivers' license listings,
immigration records, tax information, public-health data, criminal justice
sources, car rentals, credit reports, postal and shipping services, utility
bills, gaming, insurance claims, data-broker dossiers, and the like.52
Fusion centers mine information posted online53 and footage from
video cameras installed by law enforcement, transportation, and
corporate security departments.54 For instance, the Port of Long Beach's
fusion center analyzes real-time videos from public and private cameras
deployed at truck sites, warehouses, and rail corridors." An Arizona
fusion center hopes to use "facial recopnition technology" so that fusion
centers can analyze surveillance tapes.'
Fusion centers assess tips from citizens" and suspicious activity
reports ("SARs").18 Fusion centers encourage the public to report
50. Kelley Stone, Deploying and Operating an Effective Regional Fusion Center: Lessons
Learned from the North Central Texas Fusion System 6 (July 19, 2007) (unpublished paper) (on file
with Hastings Law Journal). As a New Jersey fusion center official explained, we have a "customer
philosophy of 'give us a quarter's worth of information and we'll provide you with a dollar's worth of
analysis and lead value intelligence information...."' Beyond ISE Implementation: Exploring the Way
Forward for Information Sharing: Hearing Before Intelligence, Info. Sharing, and Terrorism Risk
Assessment Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., iIith Cong. 18 (2009) [hereinafter Beyond
ISE Implementation] (statement of Colonel Rick Fuentes, Superintendent, N.J. State Police).
51. Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Centers Tap into Personal Databases,WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2008, at At
(quoting Steven G. O'Donnell, Deputy Superintendent of R.I. State Police) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
52. Ryan Singel, Fusion Centers Analyzing Reams of Americans' PersonalInformation, WIRED
BLOG (Apr. 2, 2008 1o:I6 AM), http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2oo8/o4/fusion-centers.html.
53. Michael Fickes, The Power of Fusion, Gov'T SEC. (Mar. I, 2oo8), http://govtsecurity.com/
federal-homeland-security/powerjfusionnsal.
54. Norm Beasley, Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, Maricopa Cnty, Ariz. Sheriff's Office,
Presentation at the COPS 2007 Technology Program Kickoff Conference: Fusion Centers & Their
Role in Information Sharing 28-29 (Dec. 5, 2007) (on file with Hastings Law Journal); see Fickes,
supra note 53 (noting that fusion centers analyze sound recordings from microphones connected to
computers in crime-ridden areas).
55. Matthew Harwood, Port of Long Beach Fusion Center Opens, SEC. MGMT. (Feb. 9, 2009),
http://www.securitymanagement.com/news/port-long-beach-fusion-center-opens-oo5197/.
56. Fickes, supra note 53.

57. Id.

58. Eric Schmitt, SurveillanceEffort Draws Civil LibertiesConcerns, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 28, 2oo9, at
AI2. Until late 2009, law enforcement were directed to submit suspicious activity reports about
unusual activity, such as a person's taking pictures, sweating, mumbling, and participation in extremist
groups. MIKE GERMAN & JAY STANLEY, ACLU, FusIoN CENTER UPDATE 2 (2oo8). Privacy advocates
opposed this practice, arguing that this approach risked the reporting of individuals' constitutionally
protected activities. Id. In response, the DOJ released a nationwide SAR initiative, which provided
strict guidelines for the collection of SARs. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ISE-FS-200, INFORMATION SHARING
EXCHANGE FUNCTIONAL STANDARD SusPicious AcivTY REPORTING VERSION 1.5 6-7 (2009)
[hereinafter ISE FUNCTIONAL STANDARD], available at http://www.niem.gov/pdf/ISE-FS-200ISE-
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suspicious activity, including people who photograph, videotape, sketch,
or ask detailed questions about airports, bridges, hospitals, the Internet,
and cable." Although law enforcement officers often produce SARs,6
private actors do as well. According to the director of the Southern
Nevada fusion center, "a web-based application allows [hotels and
casinos] to capture and record suspicious activity -including photos and
video clips-and translates this activity into a risk score."" In turn, the
Southern Nevada fusion center can view the SARs and risk scores.
The other central role of fusion center is to share intelligence and
information. Through virtual gateways, fusion centers distribute
information to public and private partners, including federal and state
agencies, tribal entities, law enforcement, public safety, other fusion
centers, and private firms. 63 Many store data as well. 64 The North Texas
fusion center houses over two terabytes of data acquired through the
Internet, emails, websites, and blogs.6 ' The Arizona fusion center
explains that it is the "central repository for crime-related information,
including risk and threat assessments."6 According to its director,
If you say you have information Joe Blow is a terrorist and that comes
in on a tip line, you follow up on that... .If you determine that there
are some things that would lead us to believe that Joe Blow is a
terrorist, that information could go into a file.
SARFunctionalStandard_Vi _Issued.pdf (permitting the production of SARs only on "observed
behavior reasonably indicative of pre-operationalplanning related to terrorism or other criminal
activity" and banning a person's race, ethnicity, national origin, or religious affiliation as factors
creating suspicion).
59. Reporting Suspicious Activity Questions and Answers, COLO. INFO. ANALYSIS CTR.,
https://www.ciac.co.gov/index.cfm (last visited July 4, 2011).
6o. Suspicious Activity Form, CONN. INTELLIGENCE CTR. (Aug. 2oo6), http://www.ct.gov/demhs/lib/
demhs/emergmgnit/tipsform.pdf (providing a blank form for making reports and asking officers to
identify the suspect's name, date of birth, Social Security number, sex, and race).
61. Monahan, supra note 37.
62. Id.
63. Focus on Fusion Centers: A Progress Report, HearingBefore the Ad Hoc Subcomm. on State,
Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and Integration of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. &
Governmental Affairs, ioth Cong. 35 (2oo8) [hereinafter Focus on Fusion Centers] (statement of
Matthew Bettenhausen, Dir., Calif. Office of Homeland Sec.); Wash. State Fusion Ctr., Operation DeFuse Briefing at the Washington State Fusion Center (May 14, 20Io), available at
http://www.operationdefuse.com/2oloo5/14/washington-state-fusion-center-powerpoint/
(explaining
that it "distributes information, intelligence, and products" to law enforcement agencies and private
sector partners).
64. FusioN CENTER GUIDELINEs, supra note 47, at 13.
65. Forrest Wilder, Dr. Bob's Terror Shop: The Strange and Scary Story of the North Central
Texas Fusion System, TEX. OBSERVER (Apr. 2, 2009), http://www.texasobserver.org/archives/item/

15614-3003-dr-bobs-terror-shop.
66. Definitions, ARIz. COUNTER TERRORISM INFO. CTR., http://www.azactic.gov/About/Definitions/
(last visited July 4, 2011).
67. Trip Jennings, Post-9/rl Intelligence Goes Local, N.M. INDEP. BLOG (Aug. 12, 2008, 3:00 AM),

http://newmexicoindependent.com/ 4 8i/post-9 ii-intelligence-goes-local (quoting Norm Beasley) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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When sharing intelligence with owners of critical infrastructure,
fusion centers often receive information in return." For instance, freight
operator CSX Transportation provides fusion centers access to its secure
online systems, permitting real-time tracking of the company's rail cars
and contents, while fusion centers provide it with actionable
intelligence."o Arizona's fusion center "work[s] closely with utilities, fuel
tank farms, shopping center owners, railroad operators, [and] private
security professionals."" Non-disclosure agreements facilitate informationsharing arrangements with private entities." Because fusion centers offer
few details about these information-sharing arrangements, the exact
nature of the data shared among public and private partners is unclear.73
C.

LINES OF AUTHORITY

The co-location of state, federal, and private actors creates
confusing lines of authority. Because the institutional roles of federal
employees are unclear,74 memoranda of understanding are needed "to
govern the roles and responsibilities of deployed [federal] analysts in
fusion centers."" According to DHS official David Gersten, the absence
of such agreements "could lead to a lack of clarity of institutional roles
within fusion centers.", 6
Few agreements, however, exist. This may be due to the
improvisational development of fusion centers.'" As a consultant noted of
his work with state police to start a fusion center, officials "spent a
majority of time building that building .... But they did not spend as

68. FusioN CENTER GUIDELINES, supra note 47, at C-i. The Fusion Center Guidelines recommend

partnerships with private owners of critical infrastructure, including hospitals, banking, chemical
industry, education, energy, hotels, telecommunications, shipping, and private security, among others.
Id.
69. Private Sector Information Sharing: What Is It, Who Does It, and What's Working at DHS?:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intelligence, Info. Sharing & Terrorism Risk Assessment of the H.
Comm. of Homeland Sec., Isoth Cong. 5-6 (2007) (statement of James M. Chaparro, Deputy Assistant
Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec. Office of Intelligence and Analysis); Torin Monahan, The Murky
World of 'Fusion Centres', CRIM. JUST. MATTERS, Mar. 2oo9, at 20, 20-21.
70. Alice Lipowicz, CSX to Share Data with Kentucky Fusion Center, WASH. TECH. (Aug 2, 2007),
http://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2oo7/o8/o2/csx-to-share-data-with-kentucky-fuision-center.aspx?

sc_1ang=en.
71. Joseph

Straw,

State

Perspective-Arizona,

SECURITY

MGMT.

(Jan.

I,

2007),

http://www.securitymanagement.com/article/state-perspective-arizona.
72. Focus on Fusion Centers, supra note 63, at so.
73. MASSE, supra note 32, at 27; Monahan, supra note 37, at 21.

74. Future of Fusion Centers Hearing, supra note 23, at 51 (statement of David D. Gersten,
Acting Deputy Officer for Programs and Compliance, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.)
75. Id. at 54.

76. Id.
77. Id.
78. For a general critique of improvisation in the war on terror, see David Zaring & Elena Baylis,
Sending the Bureaucracyto War, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1359 (2007).
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much time figuring out the operations inside of it."" In public or private
organizations, unclear lines of authority and vague missions inevitably
result in limited accountability, and fusion centers are no exception.8
Determining the governing law poses additional challenges. DHS
officials believe that state law governs fusion centers, because state
officials operate them."' The DHS has explained that state and local
fusion center employees "are responsible for adhering to their own State
laws and policies, including those relating to the protection of individual
privacy," while "[f]ederal employees assigned to fusion centers are
subject to the PrivacZ Act of 1974, and are responsible for adhering to
[other federal laws.]" Because the Privacy Act of 1974 applies only after
information has been incorporated into a system of records under agency
control," it is not clear why federal agents would not be required to
comply with state privacy laws while working at the fusion center.
Sharing information with private entities further complicates
matters. The DHS acknowledges that "coordinating with the private
sector raises civil liberties concerns, such as potential mission creep and
what type of individual data is shared.""' It notes that "there are
instances where this information sharing with the private sector may be
lawful and appropriate, such as addressing specific threats to buildings,
obtaining suspicious activity reports from private individuals, and
creating incident response plans that factor in private efforts."' The
legality of sharing other kinds of information and intelligence, of course,
remains in question.
The DHS and the DOJ have issued non-binding guidelines to
"ensure that fusion centers are established and operated consistently." 6

79. Renee Dianne Graphia, An Exploratory Study of the Perceived Utility and Effectiveness of
State Fusion Centers 205 (May 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University) (on file
with Hastings Law Journal).
8o. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Virtual Visibility, FOREIGN POL'Y, Nov. 2000, at 84, 84 ("Networks are
the organizational charts of choice for the information age. Corporations have been transforming
themselves from vertical hierarchies into horizontal networks for a decade .... [N]ational
governments are networking as well, linking with their regulatory counterparts across the globe to
tackle thorny transnational issues such as money laundering, securities fraud, and drug trafficking.
Unfortunately, they are doing so in ways that raise serious concerns about accountability.").
8s. PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENr, supra note 7, at 27; Robert Fox, L.A. Police Dep't, Presentation
at the Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center 18 (June 16, 2oo9), presentation available at
http://www.search.org/files/ppt/Day2-Fox.ppt (noting that fusion center participants are subject to
"laws and policies applicable to those of their respective agencies").
82. PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMEwr, supra note 7, at 26-27. Virginia recently passed legislation

exempting its fusion centers from the requirements of state privacy law. See 2oo8 Va. Acts ch. 792
(codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §H52-48, 52-49 (West 2010)); see also supra text
accompanying notes 161 & 185.
83. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(m) (2006).

84.

CIVIL LIBERTIES IMPACT ASSESSMEwr, supra note 35, at 4.
85. Id.

86. Id.; Future of Fusion Center Hearing,supra note 23, at 54 (statement of David D. Gersten,
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Although the DHS has provided guidance on the development of
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties policies,8' only four fusion centers
have released their privacy policies to the public." Many fusion centers
have, however, publicly acknowledged their obligation to comply with
the Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies in the Code of
Federal Regulations." This federal regulation limits the collection and
use of criminal intelligence data about individuals to situations where
there is reasonable suspicion to believe individuals are involved in
criminal activity.'
A rapidly growing part of the ISE, over seventy fusion centers now
gather data on topics ranging from individuals' travel patterns, home
videos, and cash payments to antiwar protests, political blogging, and
religious meetings." With generous federal funding, slickly produced
national conferences, and corporate backing, they may soon unite public
and private monitoring of individuals' lives into unified digital dossiers.
11.

THE PARADOXICAL NATURE OF DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE
PARTNERSHIPS

Proponents of fusion centers claim that the ISE produces valuable
intelligence, and that criticism of their work merely reflects an unpopular
preference for liberty over security." Lack of institutional oversight of
opaque methods has so far prevented a searching discussion of these
arguments. This Part engages in that discussion, exploring the limited
Acting Deputy Officer for Programs and Compliance, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.).
87. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE Sys. & GLOBAL JUSTICE INFO. SHARING INITIATIVE, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE & U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., GUIDE TO CONDUCTING PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENTS FOR
STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL INFORMATION SHARING INITIATIVES (2o09).
88. This includes the Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, and Mississippi fusion centers. IND.
INTELLIGENCE FUSION Crn., PRIVACY POLICY VERSION 2.0 (20o0), available at http://www.in.gov/iifc/files/
IIFCPrivacyPolicy.pdf; MICH. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS CTR., PRIVACY POLICY (201I), available at
MINN. JOINT ANALYSIS
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/msplMIOCprivacypolicy_355596-7.pdf;
CTR., PRIVACY POLICY (2011), available at http://www.nfcausa.org/(S(xipxro4542ounzyc3amnqtei))/
documentdownload.aspx?documentid=34&getdocnum=i&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=i;
Miss. ANALYSIS & INFO. CTR., PRIVACY POLICY (2007), available at http://www.homelandsecurity.ms.gov/
docs/msaic privacy-policy.pdf.
89. For instance, the Washington State fusion center summarized its "key privacy policy
elements" in a public briefing as including "28 C.F.R. Part 23, audit mechanism (being developed by
Executive Board), and the prohibition against the collection, retention, and dissemination of
information based solely on race, gender, age, sexual orientation, disability, or First Amendment
activities." Wash. State Fusion Ctr., supra note 63; see alSo 28 C.F.R. pt. 23 (2010).
9o. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BASELINE CAPABILITIES FOR STATE AND MAJOR URBAN AREA FUSION
CENTERS 16 (2008) (noting that fusion centers must adhere to 28 C.F.R. pt. 23 because they receive
federal funding).
91. GERMAN & STANLEY, supra note 27, at 12; see MARK A. RANDOL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R 4o6o2, THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE: OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW
AND OVERSIGHT CHALLENGES FOR CONGRESS II (20I0) (noting that there are seventy-two fusion
centers).

92. Slaughter, supra note 80.
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benefits and growing costs of fusion centers. As presently constituted,
fusion centers will continue to erode civil liberties without improving
homeland security.
A. (IN)SECURITY
Recent research suggests that fusion centers have improved
information sharing between and within levels of government." Whereas
in the past, when state law enforcement did little information sharing
with federal agencies and other state agencies, they increasingly do so
now.94 This has helped break down the information silos that have
impeded intelligence efforts.95
Yet it is still far from clear that more access to this digitized
information actually leads to more actionable intelligence than it
impedes. Despite spending significant resources on advanced
technologies, fusion centers have "yet to develop reliable and robust
predictive or estimative capabilities."96 Although fusion centers have
contributed to crime-fighting in cases where they assist ongoing
investigations,' they have generated little valuable intelligence about
future threats, crimes, or hazards.8
Predictive data-mining tools have proven unreliable in crime- and
terror-fighting efforts. Unlike the plethora of data on fraud in financial
transactions, large datasets on criminal and terrorist activity do not yet
exist." Data mining suffers from social science's classic "small-N"
generalizability problem: It is hard to extrapolate covering laws from a
very small number of events.'" Even if such datasets could be found,

93. See Graphia,supra note 79, at 152. In May 2oo, Renee Dianne Graphia, a graduate student,
published one of the only research pieces about the efficacy of fusion centers based on interviews of
officials working at four fusion centers.
94. Id. at 153, 166.
95. Id. Fusion centers have assisted local, state, and federal agencies in other ways. They help
locate individuals with outstanding warrants. Mo. Info. Analysis Ctr., Missouri Information Analysis
Center (MIAC), http://www.scribd.com/doc/17782446/MIAC-Power-Point-What-is-MIAC (last visited
July 4, 2011).

96. Graphia, supra note 79, at 188.
97. See, e.g., Mo. Info. Analysis Ctr., supra note 95 (noting the fusion center's success in helping
law enforcement solve various crimes, including a hit-and-run, cattle theft, burglary, copper theft, and
school shooting threat).
98. Graphia, supra note 79, at 164.
99. Data-mining applications are successful in predicting consumer behavior for credit card
companies, because they can compare a consumer's credit history with the credit histories of millions
of other consumers to predict the likelihood of delinquency. Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining:
The Need for a Legal Framework, 43 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435,473 (2008).
too. For a description of the "small-N" problem, see David Dahua Yang, EmpiricalSocial Inquiry
and Models of Causal Inference, NEw ENG. J. POL. Sea., Fall 2006, at 51, 63. Nevertheless, an academic
paper from the Naval Postgraduate School claims to "establish a chronological pattern to" the
radicalization of "our nation's three most prolific domestic lone wolf terrorists," including Timothy
McVeigh, Ted Kaczynski, and Eric Rudolph, and thus identifying a "pattern [that] can identify future
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perpetrators go to great lengths to evade detection, thereby defeating
any model that could be created from the data.'o'
Analytical tools produce many false leads, draining scarce resources
away from more effective crime-fighting endeavors." 2 Amidst the false
positives, analysts may find it difficult to find relevant information.'"
They also spend valuable time investigating innocent individuals. 4
These problems may not subside: False positives would surely
persist in digital records that can be searched and shared. There is also
little reason to believe that faulty information will be corrected, because
leads related to the preemption of future attacks are less susceptible to
refutation.o' For these reasons, computer scientist Jeff Jonas and policy
analyst Jim Harper contend that "[d]ata mining is not an effective way to
discover incipient terrorism. Though data mining has many valuable
uses, it is not well suited to the terrorist discovery problem."'6 While a
data-mining program may expertly detect illicit use of credit cards, where
there are thousands of illegal transactions to be analyzed, there are
simply too few acts of terrorism from which to extrapolate future
conduct."
False positives also "put pressure on officials to justify the
expenditure of such resources, and such pressures may lead to abuses
against innocent individuals."0 The best way to assure continued

lone wolf terrorist radicalization activity upstream." Nathan R. Springer, Patterns of Radicalization:
Identifying the Markers and Warning Signs of Domestic Lone Wolf Terrorists in Our Midst 79 (Dec.
School),
available at
Postgraduate
thesis,
Naval
(unpublished
Master's
2009)
http://www.opensourcesinfo.org/journal/2olO/II/23/patterns-of-radicalization-identifying-the-markersand-warni.html ("The next lone wolf domestic terrorist lurks in our midst, and could be following the
same chronological pattern that we saw with McVeigh, Kaczynski, and Rudolph. Apply the
chronological pattern of radicalization [discussed in this thesis] ... to future radicalization and we
could catch it upstream, before it happens.").
iol. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST
TERRORISTS: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROGRAM ASSESSMENT

77-78 (2008).

CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31798, DATA MINING: AN OVERVIEW 28
(2004). The NSA's warrantless wiretapping program produced a flood of tips that were nearly all false
alerts. Lowell Bergman et al., Spy Agency Data After Sept. Ii Led FBI to Dead Ends, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
102. JEFFREY W.

SEIFERT,

17, 2oo6, at AI.

103. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-o8-636T, HOMELAND SECURITY: FEDERAL EFFORTS
ARE HELPING To ADDRESS SOME CHALLENGES FACED BY STATE AND LOCAL FUSION CENTERS 9 (2008); see
also NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note IoI, at 80.

104. Swire, supra note 32, at 964-65; Jeff Jonas & Jim Harper, Effective Counterterrorism and the
Limited Role of Predictive Data Mining, CATO INsT. POL'Y ANALYSIS, Dec. is, 2oo6, at s, 8.

1o5. Paul Rosenzweig & Jeff Jonas, Correcting False Positives: Redress and the Watch List
Conundrum, LEGAL MEMORANDUM (Heritage Found., Wash., D.C.), June 17, 2005, at 2-3.
io6. Jonas & Harper, supra note 104, at 8. To be sure, some national security efforts, like airport

screening, may make us safer, because they provide an appearance of greater scrutiny. BRUCE
SCHNEIER, BEYOND FEAR: THINKING SENSIBLY ABOUT SECURITY IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 38 (2003).

Fusion centers cannot provide such "security theater," because they operate in secret.

to7.

Jonas & Harper, supra note 1o4, at 7-8; see also NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note so,.

so8. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note ios, at 40.
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funding is to boost arrests or other "objective" metrics of productivity. A
new crime- or terror-deterring unit may be under enormous pressure to
prosecute marginal cases.'"

B.

LIBERTY COSTS

By developing an "all hazards, all crimes, all threats" model to assist
in both terror- and non-terror-related investigations, fusion centers have
promoted an exceptionalist mindset. Power that emerged as a response
to an emergency is now being brought to bear on quotidian crime-or
the mere threat of lawbreaking."o Some fusion centers appear to be
normalizing the "state of exception" into everyday investigations. This
Part explores how a dynamic of normalizing the exception has led to
numerous infringements on crucial liberties.
i.

Expressive Freedoms

Fusion centers interfere with individuals' expressive freedoms by
encouraging the surveillance of political, racial, ethnic, and religious
groups. The Missouri Information Analysis Center's 2oo9 report to
highway patrolmen explained that "violent extremists" typically
associate with third-party candidates, such as Ron Paul and Bob Barr,
and that "potential threats" included anti-immigration and anti-tax
advocates."' According to the report, violent extremists could also be
identified through their use of bumper stickers indicating support for
libertarian groups."' In a similar vein, a California fusion center warned
local police to expect violence at antiwar protests."3
The Virginia fusion center's 2oo9 Terrorism Threat Assessment
Report urged the monitoring of student groups at the state's historically

109. Cf MARK DENBEAUX & JOSHUA DENBEAUx, REPORT ON GUANTANAMO DETAINEES: A PROFILE
OF 517 DETAINEES THROUGH ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DATA 4 (2oo6) (reporting that of
over 500 detainees, "approximately to have been charged with any crime related to violations of the
laws of war").
Ilo. Bob Drogin, Spying on Pacifists, Greens and Nuns (Dec. 7, 2oo8), http://articles.latimes.com/
2oo8/dec/o7/nation/na-cop-spy7. See generally STEPHEN H. SACHS Er AL., REVIEW OF MARYLAND STATE
POLICE COVERT SURVEILLANCE OF ANTI-DEATH PENALTY AND ANTI-WAR GROUPS FROM MARCH 2005 TO
MAY 2006 (2oo8).
III. Mo. INFO. ANALYSIS CTR., MIAC STRATEGIC REPORT: THE MODERN MILITIA MOVEMENT (2009);
see Chad Livengood, Agency Apologizes for Militia Report on Candidates,SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER,
Mar. 25, 2oo9, at IA. The fusion center intended the report only for the eyes of police officers-it was
made public after being leaked on the Internet. Livengood, supra. The fusion center subsequently
apologized to former presidential candidates Ron Paul, Bob Barr, and Chuck Baldwin for the report.

Id.
112. T.J. Greaney, 'Fusion Center' Data Draws Fire over Assertions, COLUMBIA DAILY TRIB., Mar.
14, 2009, at Ai, available at http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/2oo9/mar/i4/fusion-center-datadraws-fire-over-assertions/.

113. Josh Richman, ACLU: Spying on Activists Needs to End, OAKLAND TRIB., July 27, 2oo6, at

I.
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black colleges on grounds that they serve as "a radicalization node for
almost every type of extremist group."" 4
These activities resemble the monitoring of protected groups during
the COINTELPRO era, yet with greater scope, reach, and potential
damage." 5 Now, as then, law enforcement orchestrated domestic
surveillance of political, racial, and religious groups based on unpopular
ideas and affiliations."' Unlike the 1970s, however, fusion centers employ
technologies that identify groups from hundreds of databases, sweeping
in more legitimate expressions and associations than ever before."
Whereas intelligence gathered by federal and state law enforcement once
remained in information silos, it now can be easily shared with public and
private partners through digital networks. Moreover, bias against groups
may be embedded in a fusion center's data-mining algorithms,
systematizing it in ways that may be difficult to eradicate."'
Surveillance has a profound chilling effect."9 Members of the public
may decline to engage in certain discussions, travel to certain places, or
join legitimate political, ethnic, or religious groups. 2 o They may refrain
from exploring non-mainstream ideas both online and offline."' The

114. VA. FUSION CTR., 2009 VIRGINIA TERRORISM THREAT ASSESSMENT 9 (2oo9). In 2oo9, the North

Central Texas Fusion System distributed its Prevention Awareness Bulletin to over 1500 state officials,
urging law enforcement to report on organizations that lobby Islamic-based issues or support radical
goals such as Shariah law. Matthew Harwood, Fusion Centers Under Fire in Texas and New Mexico,
SECURITY MGMT. (Mar. 9, 2009), http://www.securitymanagement.com/news/fusion-centers-under-firetexas-and-new-mexico-oo5314.

115. Between 1956 and 1971, the FBI's COINTELPRO program engaged in domestic covert
action designed to disrupt groups engaged in the civil rights, antiwar, and communist movements. S.
SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE AcrIvrnES, FINAL
REPORT: ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. No. 94-755, at 679-732 (1976). The FBI
sought to infiltrate and disrupt these groups on the theory that "preventing the growth of dangerous
groups and the propagation of dangerous ideas would protect the national security and deter
violence." Id. at 3. COINTELPRO was not an isolated abuse. Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment

Investigationsand the Inescapable Pragmatismof the Common Law of Free Speech, 86 IND. L.J. I, 37
(2011) ("[H]istory reflects a serious risk of abuse in investigations based on the protected speech of the
targets.").
I16. Rosenthal, supra note II5, at 37-38.
117. Fusion centers might analyze individuals' digital footprints to identify "suspicious" political,
ethnic, and religious groups. Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World:
First Amendment Regulation of RelationalSurveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741, 760 (2oo8). As Katherine
Strandburg warns, such data-mining programs seek to find "malevolent associations in a haystack of
more numerous legitimate relationships." Id. at 764.

118. Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 75 U. CMI. L. REV. 343, 358
(2008) (explaining that bias can be embedded in human-created profiles encoded in computer
algorithms, as well as in the human-compiled datasets of terrorists that predictive data-mining tools
would search).
I19. Daniel J. Solove, The FirstAmendment as Criminal Procedure,82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, I43-44
(2007).

120. One imagines that individuals might reconsider visiting mosques or writing on political

message boards.
121. See Danielle Keats Citron, Fulfilling Government 2.0's Promise with Robust Privacy
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president of the University of Missouri Libertarians aptly captured this
concern by noting that the Missouri fusion center bulletin seemed
designed "to stifle political thought. There are a lot of third parties out
there .. . [that do not] express any violence."'. He lamented that if a
police officer pulled him over in the future, he would worry that his Ron
Paul bumper sticker had prompted the officer to make the stop, rather
than his driving. 2 Such profiling engenders feelings of distrust of
government."'
The decentralized and secretive nature of fusion centers prevents
the public from gauging the actual frequency of these activities. Fusion
center bulletins are not available to the public-those highlighted here
were leaked online or to the press."' Although the federal government
has provided extensive advice to fusion centers on privacy and civil
liberties policies,I26 the DHS and the DOJ admit that they have "no

formal and systematic means of auditing whether each [fusion] center is
appropriately protecting civil liberties, or using federally funded
intelligence analysts in a manner that is consistent with national goals
and objectives for fusion centers." 2 7
2.
Privacy
Fusion centers' handling of personal information implicates privacy
interests. Privacy problems arise from the collection, processing, and
disclosure of sensitive information."' Fusion centers can create digital

dossiers

about

individuals

filled

with

incorrect

or

incomplete

Protections, 78 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 822, 861 (201o) (exploring the potential chilling caused by
government's use of social media to interact with the public on policy issues). This Article does not
suggest that the surveillance of political and religious groups is necessarily justiciable, although it may
be so in circumstances where the chilling of expressive association is accompanied by objective harm,
such as reputational damage. See Linda E. Fisher, Guilt by Expressive Association: PoliticalProfiling,
Surveillance and the Privacy of Groups, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 656-57 (2004). Instead, it seeks to
underscore the various ways fusion centers impact basic liberties, including free expression and
association.
122. Greaney, supra note 112 (quoting Roger Webb, President, Univ. of Mo. Libertarians).
123. Id.
124. Swire, supra note 32. See generally FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES
UNDER AMERICAN LAW (1999) (arguing hate crimes are uniquely destructive and divisive and calling
for tougher sentences for these crimes).
125. MIAC Isn't Making 'Strategic' Reports but Won't Rule Them Out, OPERATION DEFUSE (Dec.
23, 2009), http://www.operationdefuse.Com/2oo9/12/23/miac-isnt-making-strategic-reports-but-wontrule-them-out-ky3-news-weather-sports-springfield-mo-local-news/.
126. FusIoN CENTER PRIVACY POLICY TEMPLATE, supra note 33.
127. ROLLINS, supra note 26, at 58. One-third of fusion center officials reported that they lacked
guidance on civil liberties practices. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 103, at it
(explaining that officials in nineteen fusion centers said that they lacked guidance on informationsharing policies and procedures, such as privacy and civil liberties issues).
128. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY IO6-7o (2oo9). See generally Danielle Keats

Citron & Leslie Meltzer Henry, Visionary Pragmatism and the Value of Privacy in the Twenty-First
Century, lo8 MICH. L. REV. Il07 (2010) (reviewing SOLOVE, supra).
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information.' These dossiers can have harmful consequences, leading
authorities to flag innocent individuals as persons of interest. From that
designation, it is a short step to other, more troubling classifications. 3 o
Distorted profiles disclosed to agencies, law enforcement, and others
have serious consequences."3
Consider the inclusion of a freelance journalist and evening law
student on the Connecticut fusion center's "threat" list. In January 2007,
officers arrested Ken Krayeske while he took pictures of the
gubernatorial parade, after recognizing him from the Connecticut fusion
center's security bulletin.'32 Fusion center analysts identified Krayeske as
a potential threat based on his blog posts that encouraged protests of the
governor's inaugural ball, his service as a Green Party candidate's
campaign manager, and his prior arrest for a misdemeanor at an antiwar
rally."' After Krayeske spent thirteen hours in jail, prosecutors dropped
the charges.'34 State legislators and the governor criticized the arrest,
expressing dismay about the existence of a "threat" list.'
Cases like Krayeske's may arise with greater frequency as fusion
centers analyze more and more data.'16 Aside from facing arrest,
individuals included on threat or watch lists may be unable to travel.'

129. See Citron & Henry, supra note 128, at 117-18 (analyzing the privacy problems created by
fusion centers under Solove's pragmatic theory).
130. SOLOVE, supra note I18, at 358.
131. Id. In revising the SARs protocols, the DHS may have helped prevent other privacy concerns.
Before the newly revised SARs protocols, law enforcement was instructed to submit SARs based on a
person's use of binoculars, drawing diagrams, inappropriate attire, ownership of heavy vehicles, or
espousal of extremist views. See, e.g., GERMAN & STANLEY, supra note 58, at 2. Such aggressive
information collection risked violating 28 C.F.R. pt. 23, which requires a reasonable suspicion that a
person committed a crime before collecting information. 28 C.F.R. pt. 23 (2010). Indeed, that
approach recalled the COINTELPRO surveillance that motivated Congress to require the issuance of
28 C.F.R. pt. 23 in the first place. See Frank Pasquale, Reputation Regulation: Disclosure and the
Challenge of Clandestinely CommensuratingComputing, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: SPEECH, PRIVACY,
AND REPUTATION 107, IIo (Martha Nussbaum & Saul Levmore eds., 201o) (discussing systems that
"unfairly induce the use of informal, digital methods that increase the chance of mis-recognition and
reductionism").
132. Christine Stuart, Reporter Arrested for PoliticalActivism, CONN. NEWS JUNKIE BLOG (Jan. 5,
2007 II:OI AM), http://www.ctnewsjunkie.com/ctnj.php/archives/entry/reporter-arrested-for-political
activismupdatedwith-police..report/.

133. Gregory B. Hladky, Arrest Exposes State's Threats List, NEW HAVEN REG., Jan. 9, 2007, at Ai.
134. Gerri Willis, Are You on the List?, CNN (Sept. 30, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/video#/video/

crime/2009/09/30/willis.fusion.centers.cnn.
135. Jennifer Medina, Arrest of Activist Troubles Hartford Officials, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2007, at
B6.
136. For instance, a Minnesota fusion center labeled a state representative a "suspect" after a
neighbor filed a SAR about her parking habits with the fusion center. Kaplan, supra note 24, at 40.
The representative found out about her classification as a suspect by sheer coincidence-a hacker
broke into the fusion center's system and informed her of his findings. Id.
137. Cf Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1309 (2oo8)

(exploring the due process implications of automated system determinations including the "No Fly"
list).
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Public knowledge of the collection, use, and processing of information by
fusion centers might also lead to self-censorship.' ,
Fusion centers can compromise privacy interests by sharing sensitive
personal information with private entities. Through the ISE or colocation at fusion centers, private firms could learn about employees'
appearance on threat or watch lists.'" They could screen potential hires
with this intelligence.140 Based on information shared between private
firms and fusion centers, individuals could lose jobs or face other unfair
treatment.141 Private firms could gain information about competitors.' 42
Little evidence suggests that fusion centers maintain rigorous safeguards
to prevent improper disclosures of intelligence to private sector

partners.143
For the most part, however, individuals may never learn about these
privacy invasions.'" In Maryland, activists recruited the ACLU's help
after noticing unfamiliar individuals attending their antiwar protests. '4
Only after the ACLU engaged in protracted litigation with the Maryland
State Police to force them to turn over records on the fifty-three political
activists (including two nuns and a Democratic candidate for local office)
did it learn that activists had been included on terrorist watch lists."'6 The
Maryland case is surely unusual: People do not typically learn that they
appear on threat lists.
The Maryland case demonstrates how a fusion center's participation
in the ISE can compound privacy harms in undetectable ways. The
Maryland fusion center shared erroneous terrorist classifications with
federal drug enforcement and terrorist databases, as well as with the
138. See generally, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as
Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000) (arguing that the debate surrounding data privacy protection
needs to be grounded in an appreciation for autonomy that requires a degree of freedom from
monitoring, scrutiny, and categorization by others). As the Supreme Court has made clear, individuals
have no expectation of privacy in information provided to third parties. United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435, 44o (1976); Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment,
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 330 (2oo8). Fusion centers can freely mine customers' financial records, data
brokers' digital dossiers, and cell phone location data.
139. Rebecca Andino, The Privacy Challenges of U.S. Fusion Centers, THE PRIVACY ADVISOR (Int'l
2oo8,
at
7, available at
Portsmouth,
N.H.),
May
Ass'n
of Privacy Prof'ls,
http://www.privacyassociation.org/publications/the-privacy challenges-ofU.S.-fusion centers/.
14o. Id. This is not a fanciful notion. In August 2007, New York City Public Schools fired an
employee, because the location information produced by his employer-provided cell phone showed
that he was not working when he claimed to be. David Seifman, 'Track' Man Is Sacked, N.Y. PosT,
Aug. 31, 2007, at 27.
141. GERMAN & STANLEY, supra note 27, at 14.
142. Cf Jon D. Michaels, All the President'sSpies: Public-PrivateIntelligence Partnershipsin the
War on Terror, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 901, 914-16 (2oo8).
143. See, e.g., FRANcEs H. BUTLER & JANET S. MURRILL, Y-12 NAT'L SEC. COMPLEX,
INTEROPERABILrrY: DATA DEFINITION AND CHARACTERIZATION 18 (2008).

144. Citron, supra note 137, at 1282.
145. Madigan, supra note 20.

146. Drogin, supra note I io.
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NSA. 47 Michael German explains that it is impossible to be sure that the
activists have been removed from all watch lists, given the sharing of
false information with so many agencies. 14
3. Mission Creep
Fusion centers' "all hazards, all crimes, all threats" mandate may
lead to surveillance of countless activities, betraying their original
conception as terror- and crime-fighting tools.' 49 Fusion center officials
have insisted upon a flexible mission to help generate "buy in" from
other local and state agencies that did not feel threatened by terrorism.'
As a Government Accountability Office report noted, fusion centers
expanded their intelligence mission "to convince local legislators they're
worth financing with taxpayer money in the future."'5 ' Diffuse authority
means that fusion centers can easily become unmoored from their antiterror beginnings. 5 2
For example, the Alabama Department of Homeland Security had
difficulty developing support from local police departments for its
"Virtual Alabama" database collaboration with Google.'53 As
surveillance researcher Torin Monahan explains, "This obstacle was
overcome ... when

DHS

promised

to

include

a

GIS

[geospatial

information system] overlay for all registered sex offenders in the state,
showing exactly where each of them are supposed to be residing."' 54
What began as a homeland security project quickly turned into a state
law enforcement one -a common outcome in many fusion centers.
147. Maryland State Police Surveillance Practices & Policies: Hearing Before the S. Judicial
Proceedings Comm., 2008 Leg., 425th Sess. 2-3 (Md. 2008), available at http://www.aclu-md.org/
Index%2ocontent/NoSpying/GermanTestimony.pdf (statement of Michael German, ACLU Policy
Counsel for Nat'l Sec. Issues) (citing Sachs, supra note I1o).
148. Id. at 3.

149. Hylton, supra note 34. Indeed, the Fusion Center Guidelines reflected this sentiment. FUSION
CENTER GUIDELINES, supra note 47.

150. RoLLINS, supra note 26, at 21. An official noted that "it is impossible to create 'buy in'
amongst local law enforcement agencies and other public sectors if a fusion center was solely focused
on counterterrorism, as the center's partners often didn't feel threatened by terrorism, nor did they
think their community would produce would-be terrorists." Id.
151. Eileen Larence of the General Accountability Office explained that the majority of the
centers adopted a broader focus than just counterterrorism to "increase[] the center's
sustainability ... by including additional stakeholders who could provide staff and support .. .. " U.S.
Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 103, at 3.
152. Torin Monahan & Neal A. Palmer, The Emerging Politics of DHS Fusion Centers,
40 SECuRrrY DIALOGUE 617, 626 (2oo9).
153. TORIN MONAHAN, SURVEILLANCE IN THE TIME, OF INSECURITY 46 (2010).

154. Id. Privacy groups have labeled this tendency in fusion center policy "mission creep," and we
have discussed the dubious grounds for transition from an anti-terrorism to an "all threats/all hazards"
mission. However, because fusion centers effectively integrate the coercive force of local law

enforcement into a quasi-militarized domestic intelligence apparatus, the label "mission creep" does
not fully do justice to the depth and breadth of the shift that the fusion center approach represents.
155. According to the CRS report, "less than 15% of fusion centers interviewed for [the report]
described their mission as solely counterterrorism. In the last year, many counterterrorism-focused
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As fusion centers collect and analyze data for increasingly farreaching purposes, their activities will implicate far more individuals,
along with their privacy and civil liberty interests. Because fusion centers
adhere to what Jack Balkin has called "information gluttony" without
sufficient quality control, their mission will continue to expand more
broadly in search of more data that might somehow produce effective
analysis."' In turn, more individuals may be erroneously placed on watch
lists and the like. This can lead to further abuse, which is largely immune
from oversight, as the next Parts of this Article explain.
C.

TRANSPARENCY CONCERNS

Fusion center proponents may claim that each of the disturbing
incidents described above is just an aberration, the result of "bad
apples." However, it is impossible to determine just how often troubling
behavior actually occurs due to the opacity of fusion center operations.
Beyond official statements and press reports, it is challenging to obtain
information about their operations. As German explains, "We've built
this network, and nobody's policing it [and] ...

. [nlobody knows exactly

what each fusion center is doing. Even the best fusion centers operate
under a cloak of secrecy."' 57
Privacy advocacy groups have attempted to shed light on fusion
center practices with the Freedom of Information Act'"5 and open
government requests. In some cases, fusion centers have refused to
respond to requests about their work on the grounds that they do not
collect and retain data.'59 The New Mexico chapter of the ACLU, for
instance, has filed several open records requests seeking to find out what
kind of information is being reviewed, but has been stymied on the
grounds that fusion centers lack "material product" that would be subject
to these open records requests, commonly known as "sunshine
requests."'
Fusion centers may also be immune to open sunshine requests
pursuant to a variety of statutory exemptions. In some states, fusion
centers are not obliged to explain their refusal to open up their records at

centers have expanded their mission to include all-crimes and/or all-hazards." RoiLINS, supra note 26,
at 21.

156. Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. I, 18
(2008).
157. Wilder, supra note 65 (quoting Michael German). As Julie Cohen notes of government's
purchase of personal data from data brokers, privacy restrictions do not apply to such purchases, and
government "has deployed secrecy to great effect where these initiatives are concerned, with the result
that we still understand too little about many of them." Julie E. Cohen, The Inverse Relationship
Between Secrecy and Privacy, 77 Soc. REs. 883, 885 (2010).
158. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
159. Hylton, supra note 34.
16o. Id.
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all. For example, in 2008 the Virginia state legislature amended its open
sunshine statute to exempt fusion center practices from inquiry. 6
Moreover, the complex network of fusion centers often prevents
individuals from determining who owns information about them in order
to submit a redress request to that entity.6' Even if one entity does
correct its record, there is no guarantee that its correction will reach
other nodes in the network with which it has shared such data.
Given this record of privacy violations and mission creep, fusion
centers' critics promote lifting the veil of secrecy surrounding their
work. 6 3 While reformers should respect legitimate needs for secrecy, new
forms of accountability must emerge. Fusion centers have put us on a
path toward a world where all data sources are open to law enforcement
inspection and may be used to generate probable cause for
investigation."' Given the enormous new potential for abuse of such

power, the new surveillance network needs to be subject to the same rule
of law it is designed to enforce.
DHS RESPONSE AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS
Some surveillance advocates blame fusion centers' failures on an
incomplete implementation of the fusion concept. They believe that the
centers could detect, deter, and defeat more security threats if they had
more access to larger stores of data."' They reason that privacy harms
will be ameliorated once decisionmakers have a com lete picture of
people who have been unfairly targeted or categorized.' To put it more
darkly: Why care about privacy if you have nothing to hide? 6 '
Fortunately, DHS's Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
("CRCL") takes privacy more seriously, in accordance with several
III.

THE

161. 2008 Va. Acts ch. 792 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. H§52-48, 52-49 (West 2010)).
162. Andino, supra note 139, at 7.
163. Trebor Scholz, Introduction: Points of Control, 77 Soc. RES. 931, 938-39 (2010).

164. For a discussion of the potential uses of data mining, see Christopher Slobogin, Distinguished
Lecture: Surveillance and the Constitution, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1105, I II8 (2009) ("Event-driven data

mining is the most insidious form of data mining because it is conducted in the absence of a particular
suspect; rather it is designed to discover the perpetrator of a past or future event using profiles or

algorithms that purport to describe general characteristics of such a perpetrator.").
165. STEWART A. BAKER, SKATING ON STILrs: WHY WE AREN'T STOPPING TOMORROw'S TERRORISM

313 (2010). ("[T]he spread of cheap information about all of us will change our relationship to the
world. We will have fewer secrets. Crippling government by preventing it from using information that
everyone else can get will not give us back our secrets."). Baker is a former Assistant Secretary for
Policy at the Department of Homeland Security. Id. at ix-x.
166. Id. at 336 ("If the lawyer's solution is to put a predicate between government and the data and
the bureaucrat's solution is to put use restrictions on the data, then... the auditor's solution .. . [is to
protect personal data] by rules, so long as the rules are enforced.").
167. For important insights on the concerns expressed in the "I've got nothing to hide" argument
against privacy, see generally Daniel J. Solove, "I've Got Nothing to Hide" and Other
Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745 (2007).
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statutory mandates. In response to the multiple problems chronicled in
Part II, the DHS and its Office of Inspector General have initiated
several programs designed to protect civil liberties. Federal legislation
requires the DHS to report on the privacy and civil liberties impact of
fusion centers' operations. This Part explores how the DHS has
responded to the problems articulated in Part II and the limits of its
approach.
A.

DHS RESPONSE
CRCL aims to ensure that fusion centers' information sharing is
conducted in a manner "consistent with Constitutional, statutory,
regulatory, and other legal and policy requirements, including applicable
privacy and civil liberties standards."'" Its privacy professionals review
fusion center actions to promote compliance. Putting teeth into their
efforts, recent appropriations legislation mandates that fusion centers
generate privacy policies that are approved by the DHS Privacy Office
within six months of the approval of federal grants.'
In April 2010, the DHS and the DOJ released the Fusion Center
Privacy Policy Template ("Template"), which provides model privacy
policy provisions based in part on well-accepted Fair Information
Principles.' The Template urges fusion centers to acknowledge explicitly
their obligation to abide by relevant laws"' and to appoint dedicated
privacy officers."' It suggests enhanced protections for terrorism-related
information, which do not "in any manner[] restrict fusion centers from
collecting and sharing 'all crimes-all hazards' information.""
The DHS also provided guidance on fusion centers' privacy
practices in its 2008 Privacy Impact Assessment ("PIA"). 4 The PIA
instructed: "DHS should only collect PII [personally identifiable
information] that is directly relevant and necessary to accomplish specific
lawful purpose(s) and only retain P11 for as long as necessary to fulfill the
THE

168. Civii LIBERTIES IMPACT ASSFSSMIENT, supra note 35.
169. BUREAU OF JUSTICE Sys. & GLOBAL JUSTICE INFO. SHARING INITIATIVE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE &

U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEc., FACr SIIlEE: ENHANCING THE PRIVACY, CiviL RIGirTs, AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES FRAMEWORK FOR STATE AND MAJOR URBAN AREA FUSION CENTERS 2 (20Io). Although DHS
officials emphasize that state and local officers "own" fusion centers, grant funding provides significant
leverage to ensure compliance with the ISE Privacy Guidelines. Id.
170. FUSION CENTER PoIcy TEMPLIE, supra note 33, at 5-6, 41 (listing eight Fair Information
Principles -collection
limitation, data quality, purpose specification, use limitation, security
safeguards, openness, individual participation, and accountability -though noting that some "may not
apply in all instances of an integrated justice system").
171. Id. at7.
172. Id. at 9.
173. Id. at 3.
174. PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 27-28 (raising concerns about military and
private firm participation in fusion centers); see also CivIl LIBERTIES IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note
35, at 14.
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specified purpose(s)."' 7 ' Data exchanges should also be based on
"reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that may lead to terrorism."" 6
Beyond these procedural protections, fusion centers are required to
alter their methods of collecting and handling SARs.'77 Once permitted
to collect and distribute SARs on the basis of mere suspicion, officers
must now ensure that the reported activity is "reasonably indicative" of
terrorism or criminal activity.' 7 This brings fusion centers' collection of
SARs closer to classic limits on law enforcement."7 Only a small number
of activities now trigger SARs, rather than the capacious list that the
fusion centers had previously suggested.'8
Moreover, the new standards for SARs note the importance of
"privacy fields" in databases-those that include "information that may
be used to identify an individual"-suggesting that requestors might not
be able to view them.'8 ' Race, ethnicity, national origin, or religious
affiliation should not be considered to create suspicion, except if used as
part of a specific suspect description.
B.

CONTINUING CHALLENGES

We are encouraged by the DHS's recent attention to fusion centers'
guidance templates and privacy policies. Its privacy officer continues to
hold community hearings on privacy and data integrity, seemingly
accepting the premise that privacy protection and mission integrity are
mutually reinforcing aims.' Nevertheless, this Part explores how existing
efforts to safeguard individual liberties neglect critical, and troubling,
dimensions of the ISE: the ongoing opportunities for regulatory arbitrage
designed to evade the DHS's privacy principles, as well as secrecy
practices that can prevent redress of individual harms and mask conflicts
of interest.
i. Regulatory Arbitrage
Because fusion centers often consist of collaborations among
governmental units (and private parties), they create opportunities to
shift activity to the least stringent regulatory regime. This is known as the

175. PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 21 (emphasis omitted).
176. Id.

177. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text (discussing SARs program).
178. Email from Greg Nojeim, Senior Counsel, Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., to Authors (June 3,
2010) (On file with Hastings Law Journal).
179. ISE FUNCTIONAL STANDARD, supra note 58, at 2. For a prescient call for limits of this type, see

Solove, supra note I18, at 354 (calling for the return to a warrant standard for data-mining projects).
i8o. Email from Greg Nojeim, Senior Counsel, Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., to Authors, supra
note 178; see also supra note 131 (discussing SARs).

181. Email from Greg Nojeim, Senior Counsel, Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., to Authors, supra
note 178 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 58, at 2).
182. Community Engagement, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/
structure/gc_1273873 o 5 87o6.shtm#7 (last visited July 4, 2011).
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problem of regulatory arbitrage.' Fusion centers may permit federal
personnel to see intelligence without integrating it into federal systems
governed by the federal Privacy Act of 1974, thus ensuring the operation
of a state's less-stringent privacy laws.184 For instance, as mentioned
earlier, Virginia has exempted its fusion centers from the obligations of
state privacy law, providing strong incentives to ensure that records
remain only instate systems and not in federal ones.'' As the previous
Part also noted, Virginia also amended its open sunshine act to exempt
fusion centers from any disclosure requirements.'8
One state's privacy protections can be evaded by fusion center
personnel who use the ISE to search for data from states with weaker
privacy laws.'"" If, for instance, Florida prohibits its police from gathering
information in particular circumstances about an organization or
individual's First Amendment activity, and Mississippi does not; a
Florida fusion center's personnel can obtain the information from
Mississippi even though it was collected in violation of Florida rules.i
Such regulatory arbitrage may not be deliberate; there may be no clear
way for a Florida fusion center to know that it should not be receiving
information provided by the Mississippi fusion center.
Fusion centers may also push their activities beyond any law's reach.
In many fusion centers, staffers' searches of names or activities often do
not produce records that would need to meet certain legal
requirements."" Because fusion centers access and analyze data through

183. We borrow the term "regulatory arbitrage" from the private sector context in which it
developed. See, e.g., Michael S. Knoll, The Ancient Roots of Modern FinancialInnovation: The Early
History of Regulatory Arbitrage, 87 OR. L. REV. 93, 94 (2008) ("The exploitation of regulatory
inconsistencies is a major impetus for financial innovation. Indeed, it might be the primary impetus.
There is a strong incentive to innovate around prohibited or disadvantaged transactions. These
innovations are commonly referred to as regulatory arbitrage."). We discuss solutions to the
regulatory arbitrage problem in Part V.B infra.
184. Because state-run fusion centers are not federal agencies, such fusion centers may share
records with federal agencies, bypassing the goal of the Privacy Act. One could argue that existing
federal privacy law gives fusion centers little reason to engage in such arbitrage, given its exemption of
law enforcement and national security intelligence from many of its obligations. See Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j), (k)(2) (2006). Nonetheless, for information falling outside these
exemptions, which is surely a great deal, given the collection of "all hazards" information, the Privacy
Act bars federal agencies from sharing information records without the permission of individuals
whose records would be transferred. Id. Information directly gathered by the DHS would implicate
"fair information practices as set out in the Privacy Act of 1974." 6 U.S.C. § 142(a)(2) (2oo6)
(describing the duties of the agency's Privacy Officer).
185. See 2008 Va. Acts ch. 792 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. H§52-48, 52-49 (West
2010)).

186. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
187. Email from Greg Nojeim, Senior Counsel, Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., to Authors, supra
note 178 (noting his concern about policy shopping and offering the MississippilFlorida example).
188. Id.
189. GERMAN & STANLEY, supra note 27, at io-ii. Federal regulation 28 C.F.R. pt. 23, if applied
and enforced, might assuage these concerns, if fusion centers interpret access to data as collection
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virtual networks, they do not host data but instead refresh it regularly.'"
When the data is not actually residing permanently on a fusion center's
server, it does not trigger the fair information practices required by some
state and federal laws, thus analysts there would not be subject to key
open-government obligations.' 9'
2. Secrecy and Conflicts of Interest
Other crucial concerns stem from the current secrecy of fusion
centers' activities.' The opacity of fusion centers' practices may prevent
the correction of inaccuracies in the ISE.' The more information is
shared, the more difficult it becomes to track down and correct any
errant data. This is because the "complex network of fusion centers and
the federal government may make it particularly difficult for an
individual to determine which entity 'owns' his or her information in
order to submit a redress request to that entity."'" Our examination of
the existing forty-two fusion center websites available for public
inspection revealed that only one published a clear redress mechanism. 95
Secrecy also creates opportunities for conflicts of interest. As a
growing literature suggests, privatization can be less an arm's length
transaction between government and business than a veritable marriage
covered by federal regulation. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 23 (2olo). But since FOIA does not apply to the work
of state personnel, the public may have no way of knowing whether fusion centers are complying with
28 C.F.R. Pt. 23. Moreover, however detailed the aspirations in documents like the ISE Functional
Standard and the Privacy Impact Assessment may be, the DHS has been slow to institutionalize
enforcement.
190. GERMAN & STANLEY, supra note 27, at so.
191. Id. Ordinarily, government agencies are obligated to "locate, compile, organize, store and
eventually discard the online content." Alan J. Bojorquez & Damien Shores, Open Government and
the Net: Bringing Social Media into the Light, II TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 45, 50 (2009). For emails, the
retention period depends on the information and content within the email. Id. at 51192. GERMAN & STANLEY, supra note 27, at 15 ("The inevitable result of a data-mining approach to
fusion centers will be: Many innocent individuals will be flagged, scrutinized, investigated, placed on
watch lists, interrogated or arrested, and possibly suffer irreparable harm to their reputation, all
because of a hidden machinery of data brokers, information aggregators and computer algorithms.").
193. For example, even though the Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center ("IIFC") has a model
privacy policy in many respects, it explicitly reserves the right to withhold the "the existence, content,
and source of the information" from the requestor in many cases, which makes it difficult to populate
the entire ISE with redress efforts. IND. INTELLIGENCE FuSION CnR., supra note 88, at 13. Greg Nojeim,
Senior Counsel at the Center for Democracy & Technology, has affirmed our fear that this remains a
widespread problem. Email from Greg Nojeim, Senior Counsel, Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., to
Authors, supra note 178 ("Ifyou go to e.g. the Texas fusion center and ask them to correct errant data
in their data base about you, but their information came from the Louisiana fusion center, Texas is
forbidden from telling you about the source of that information and can't correct it, and there's no
process for triggering a correction by Louisiana.").
194. Andino, supra note 139, at 7.

195. The one center with a redress mechanism is in Indiana. See IND. INTELLIGENCE FusiON CTR.,
supra note 88, at 13 ("Upon satisfactory verification (fingerprints, driver's license, or other specified
identifying documentation) of his or her identity and subject to the conditions specified in K.s (2),
below, an individual is entitled to know the existence of and to review the information about him or
her that has been gathered and retained by the IIFC.").
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of institutions.' Michael Birnhack and Niva Elkin-Koren contend that
information-sharing arrangements between the public and private sector
are mutually beneficial: They enhance government's monitoring capacity
while helping businesses identify fraud and piracy. 9 7 But in their view,
this transaction can create an "unholy alliance" between governments
that wish to exercise their power and online players that seek to maintain
and strengthen their dominant role in the market.'o
Jon Michaels has also explored this concern with great insight.
Michaels points to FedEx's cooperation with the government as an
indication of a larger trend. He explains that after FedEx's CEO
announced that the company would cooperate with the government "up
to and including the line on which we would be doing a disservice to our
shareholders,"'" FedEx received a range of government perks, including
special access to government security databases, a seat on the FBI's
regional terrorism task force-where it was the only private company so
represented-and an exceptional license from the State of Tennessee to
develop an internal police force.2 o
Fusion centers are part of a wide range of domestic intelligence
activities that raise serious questions of government integrity. The central
issue here is not necessarily the propriety or impropriety of a fusion
center having access to any particular set of data. Rather, it is a much
larger concern about the balance of power between citizens and the state.
As the next Part proposes, a new type of accountability is required.
IV. NETWORK ACCOUNTABILITY
Reacting both to a civil liberties backlash, and to growing concerns
about the overall effectiveness of "Top Secret America,"2 o' the DHS has
issued a number of guidance documents and "templates" to govern
future data collection and analysis at fusion centers.o2 Although we
applaud these efforts, we do not believe that they will adequately address
the insecurity and liberty problems raised in Part II, and the regulatory
arbitrage and secrecy concerns addressed in Part III. DHS efforts are
based in an agency-centered model of the rule of law that fails to address
the unique challenges of networked interagency collaboration. These
196. Gillian E. Metzger, Privatizationas Delegation,103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1378 (2oo3).
197. Michael D. Birnhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, The Invisible Handshake: The Reemergence of the
State in the DigitalEnvironment,8 VA. J.L. & TECH 6, 27 (2003).
198. Id.

199. Michaels, supra note 142, at 915 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 914-16.
201. For an expos6 of concerns raised by our foreign and domestic intelligence apparatus, see
Washington Post reporters Dana Priest and William M. Arkin's series, blog, and multimedia database
on the growing U.S. intelligence community. Top Secret America, WASH. PosT,
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america (last visited July 4, 201).
202. See supra Part III.A; see also FusioN CENTER POLICY TEMPLATE, supra note 33.
200.
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they engender-are

often at the heart of fusion centers' privacy violations, ineffectiveness,
and mission creep.
The unmonitored and unregulated spread of information from one
node of the network to another (or to all other nodes) both swamps
analysts and threatens to leave an indelible stigma on individuals
unjustifiably caught in the network's dragnet. As Alasdair Roberts notes,
"opaque networks" have proliferated since 9/11, deflecting scrutiny even
more effectively than their component parts." In Roberts's view, opaque
networks can be either horizontal -including international anti-terror
cooperation-or vertical-involving various levels of authority in a
federal system.2 o4 Roberts attributes U.S. information-sharing practices to
policymakers' fascination with the alleged strengths of al-Qaeda, a "full
matrix" network where each cell could communicate easily with all the
others.o"
For some national security theorists, only a structure as nimble and
as connected as the terrorist groups themselves could match the threat
they pose. In the Jack Bauer imagery of key Bush-era officials,206 our
post-9/i i era demands a rapid response from experts freed from the
tedium of legal niceties. Al-Qaeda's full matrix network should not be
the model of protection to which the ISE should aspire.
This Part proposes forms of "network accountability" designed to
enhance security and to promote civil liberties and privacy. It offers
technical standards that promote the security objective of "connecting
the dots" with a commitment to "watch the watchers" by recording all
uses of the ISE. Like the "black box" recorder often recovered from
plane crashes, immutable audit logs would help policymakers determine
responsibility for intelligence community actions. Such logs would also
be integral to the cost-benefit analysis we endorse, as a way of assessing
the overall effectiveness of the domestic intelligence apparatus.
A.

IMMUTABLE AUDIT LOGS AND REDRESS MECHANISMS

America has a tradition of combining concerns about privacy with
guarantees of government openness." Louis Brandeis, whose Supreme
203. ALASDAIR ROBERTS, BLACKED Our: GOVERNMENT SECRECY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 138

(2oo6). A Canadian tortured in Syria found it difficult to obtain redress based on repeated deflections
of his queries by Canadian, Syrian, and U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies, each based on
the asserted needs of the other entities for secrecy. Id. at 136-37.
204. Id. at 141.
205. Id. at 14o-41.

206. MONAHAN, supra note 154, at 36 (describing White House events featuring producers of
television series 24, whose co-creator, Joel Surnow, "socialized with former Homeland Security
Secretary Michael Chertoff, who says the show 'reflects real life').
207. Marc Rotenberg, Privacy and Secrecy after September iI, in BOMBS AND BANDWIDTH: THE
EMERGING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND SECURITY 132, 138-39 (Robert
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Court opinions and scholarship left an indelible mark on privacy law,
envisioned a world in which law could protect the private sphere from
prying eyes while ensuring a robust public sphere of transparency.
Brandeis's work inspires our vision of network accountability for fusion
centers. We must build civil liberties safeguards into the technical
architecture of our domestic intelligence network."
Technical standards can play a crucial role in securing network
accountability."o According to federal regulation, fusion centers are
supposed to employ audit logs that record the activity taking place in the
information-sharing network,"' including "queries made by users, the
information accessed, information flows between systems, and date- and
time-markers for those activities.". 2 Audit logs typically are not tamper
resistant: They can be changed by personnel without a record of their
alteration. This feature undermines a crucial purpose of audit logs-to
aid in the detection of deliberate misuses of the system.2 13
Immutable audit logs help solve this problem. With immutable audit
logs, personnel cannot defeat the network's recordkeeping function."'
This secures a permanent record of the network's activity while
increasing the probative value of logs as evidence.' If immutable audit
logs of fusion centers are regularly reviewed, misconduct might be
discovered, wrongdoers might be held responsible, and similar misuses

Latham ed., 2003) (explaining that "the American tradition of seeking to protect privacy while limiting
government secrecy" reflect our complementary values of privacy and openness).
208. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471-85 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See
generally Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805 (2010)
(exploring Brandeis's conception of privacy in The Right to Privacy). For a fascinating historical
analysis of Louis Brandeis's views on privacy and transparency, see generally Neil M. Richards, The
Puzzle of Brandeis,Privacy, and Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (2010).
209. See Citron, supra note 137, at 1305-o6 (arguing that technological due process requires the
inclusion of audit trails into automated systems making decisions about important constitutional
rights, such as welfare benefits).
210. Generally speaking, standards play a crucial role in networks-they determine how people
and entities are connected. DAVID GREWAL, NETWORK POWER: THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF
GLOBALIZATION 21 (2oo9).

Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies, 28 C.F.R. 20.23 (2010).
212. MARKLE TASK FORCE ON NAT'L SEC. IN THE INFO. AGE, MARKLE FOUND., IMPLEMENTING A
TRUSTED INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT: USING IMMUTABLE AUDrr LOGS TO INCREASE SECURrY,
TRUST, AND ACCOUNTABILITY I (2oo6) [hereinafter MARKLE TASK FORCE].
211.

Id. at 2.
It is interesting to note that even John Poindexter, proponent of the controversial data-mining
proposal called "Total Information Awareness," embraced the use of immutable audit logs. SHANE
HARRIS, THE WATCHERS 190 (2010) ("[John Poindexter] proposed an 'immutable audit trail,' a master
record of every analyst who had used the TIA [Total Information Awareness] system, what data
they'd touched, and what they'd done with it... to spot suspicious patterns of use.... Poindexter
wanted to use TIA to watch the watchers.").
215. Id.
213.

214.
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might be deterred.216 Such technical safeguards are crucial to avoid
abuses like those outlined in Part

II.217

Technical standards for immutability are also important. A "write
once, read-many (WORM) storage drive" could record all uses of the
system, since it can be "designed so that data cannot be altered once it is
written to disc.".... To assure system robustness, "records can be serialized
by a system-generated counter and then given a digital signature."...
While such processes might have created a mountain of paperwork in the
analog age, declining costs for digital storage and wiki-based records
make it plausible today. As a technological matter, the cost of
information storage has consistently dropped over time, and recent
developments suggest even more dramatic advances in coming years."'
Immutable audit logs connecting threat designations and SARs to
their instigators might help solve another problem: data integrity and
relevance. They would prevent people from appearing on watch or threat
lists without supporting evidence tethered to it. That evidence would in
turn be watermarked with its provenance, assuring attributions and
verifiability of observations (much as citations help assure the validity of
an assertion in an academic work). Such safeguards could help correct
mistakes throughout the network as well. As Jonas and Rosenzweig have
argued, the No-Fly database should provide "tethering and full
attribution of data to allow corrections to propagate through the
system."2 ' This demonstrates how promoting privacy and effectiveness
can be mutually reinforcing."
For example, indiscriminate fusion center data mining of online
musings may cast far too wide a dragnet if it monitors anyone who uses
the word "bomb" in postings.223 Proper redress mechanisms could allow
216. MARKLE TASK FORCE, supra note 212, at 3 ("Access to the audit logs can be granted to trusted
parties, such as an agency's Inspector General or the Government Accountability Office, which can
assess compliance with information sharing and privacy guidelines as well as with a system's stated
policies. Even for classified systems, unclassified versions of reports can be made public that describe
the extent of compliance with stated policies.").
217. BAKER, supra note 165, at 315 ("[G]overnment workers with access to personal
data ... should be subject to audit, to challenge, and to punishment if they use the data for improper
purposes.").
218. MARKLE TASK FORCE, supra note 212, at 2.
219. Id.
220. VIKTOR MAYER-SCH6NBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL AGE 65, 71
(2oo9) (describing "plummeting storage prices," and observing that "[e]xperts suggest that the trend of

cheaper storage" will continue into the twenty-first century).
221. Rosenzweig & Jonas, supra note 105, at I.

222. Id. at 2 ("The prospect of being forever a screening candidate, or not being allowed to fly, or
being denied a privilege, or being subject to covert surveillance based on a computer-generated
caution derived from watch list comparisons, rightfully is a troubling notion. Moreover, it is a waste of
finite resources.").
223. There are several examples of the overly broad "dragnet" in which email surveillance can

result. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 214, at 112 (describing how Condoleezza Rice, Hillary Clinton, and
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the centers to drop from surveillance a theater critic who frequently
judges certain plays to be a "bomb," or a hungry sandwich-lover who
orders "bombers" online.
As Helen Nissenbaum has eloquently argued, privacy rights demand
some basic level of information control, a "contextual integrity" afforded
to data subjects rendered objects by surveillance.224 Threats occasioned
by loss of privacy can be defused once a decisionmaker has a fuller
picture of a person unfairly categorized by the new surveillance systems.
Behind any particular transformative classification -from citizen to
"enemy within," from law-abiding individual to "suspect"-lies a
narrative, an interpretive framework designed to "connect the dots."
At times of danger, it can be all too easy to associate a given
individual with an established threat to order. Yet in the fullness of time,
the accused, and citizens generally, can begin to rewrite those parts of the
narrative that were erroneous and unjust. Whatever their effect on the
juridical order, immutable audit logs are designed to enable the tracing
of history and its rewriting, as occurred during the Church Committee
hearings, and more recently in the Iraq War inquiry in Britain."'
B.

OBJECTIVE THREAT MEASURES

Academics have warned for some time that a "terrorism industry"
could be driving the development of fusion center technology more than
objective national security needs. John Mueller has stated that the
terrorist threat to the U.S. is both "overblown" and virtually impossible
to deter, detect, or mitigate given current counterterrorism strategies. ,6
Mueller notes that "politicians and terrorism bureaucrats have an
incentive to pass along vague and unconfirmed threats to protect
themselves from later criticism should another attack take place."2 "
Reports to Congress have questioned the effectiveness of fusion
centers in particular."' Journalists have challenged the utility of a
William Cohen were identified as persons warranting further investigation by a 1999 Pentagon datamining program designed to detect participants in a military smuggling ring).
224. Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 155 (2oo4)

("[W]hether a particular action is determined a violation of privacy is a function of several variables,
including the nature of the situation, or context; the nature of the information in relation to that
context; the roles of agents receiving information; their relationships to information subjects; on what
terms the information is shared by the subject; and the terms of further dissemination.").
225. For an insightful account of the Church Committee investigation, see FREDERICK A.O.
SCHWARTZ, JR. & Aziz Z. HuQ, UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF

TERROR 32-52 (2oo7) (describing the Church Committee's exposure of hundreds of abuses of domestic
intelligence gathering, under the leadership of Idaho Senator Frank Church).
226. JOHN MUELLER, OVERBLOWN: How POLITICIANS AND THE TERRORISM
NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS, AND WHY WE BELIEVE THEM 37 (2oo6).

INDUSTRY

INFLATE

227. Id.

228. ROLLINS, supra note 26, at 25 ("While some states have seen limited success in integrating
federal intelligence community analysis into their fusion centers, research indicates most continue to
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persistent domestic security apparatus.' Fusion center advocates face
increasing pressure as budget crunches lead to new scrutiny of security
spending.2 30
Ultimately, it is unclear whether spy agencies have produced
benefits greater than their costs.23 ' Ordinary appropriations might be cut
when an agency has not proven its value. But in the case of fusion
centers, official Washington's attitude has been: Give the fusion concept
more time and money, and eventually it will bear fruit."' Whatever
failures occur, advocates of a more powerful and integrated domestic
intelligence apparatus are likely to argue that any failures of intelligence
simply indicate underinvestment in it, rather than more fundamental
problem in its structure or conception.233
Conservative critics of government spending worry that this
doubling-down dynamic will guarantee funding to agencies that do not
deserve it.234 Civil libertarians express concern that law enforcement
personnel will blame any failures on "archaic" privacy laws.2 35 Both sides,
however, agree that initiatives like fusion centers are likely to take an

struggle with developing a 'true fusion process' which includes value added analysis of broad streams
of intelligence, identification of gaps, and fulfillment of those gaps, to prevent criminal and terrorist
acts.").
229. See, e.g., TIM SHORROCK, SPIES FOR HIRE: THE SECRET WORLD OF INTELLIGENCE OUTSOURCING
(2oo8); Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Washington's $8 Billion Shadow, VANITY FAIR, Mar. 2007,
at 342.

23o. ROLLINS, supra note 26, at 14 ("If the United States is not the target of a successful terrorist
attack, homeland security funding, arguably, may decrease."); William Maclean, Crisis Sharpens
Scrutiny of Security Spending, REUTERS, Feb. 25, 2oo9, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/

idUSTRE5IO2SM20090225 ("[Bludget pressures will force policymakers increasingly to identify
waste and question big-ticket purchases of technology, a trend underpinned by worries in the West
that intrusive monitoring poses a risk to civil liberties, analysts say.").
231. MATTHEw AID, THE SECRET SENTRY: THE UNTOLD HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
304-05 (2009) (sharing that former senior State Department official Herbert Levin noted that while
NSA can point to instances where it has been helpful, "whether they're worth the billions that are

spent, is a genuine question in my mind").
232. S. REP. No. I I-I99, at 6 (2010).
233. AID, supra note 231, at 304-05. See generally JAMES BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE PALACE: A REPORT
ON AMERICA'S MOST SECRET AGENCY (1982) (discussing NSA defenders' positions).
234. Ross Douthat, Op-Ed, The Great Consolidation, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 20Io, at A23; see also
generally Veronique de Rugy, What Does Homeland Security Spending Buy? (Am. Enter. Inst.,
Working Paper No. 107, 2004), available at http://www.aei.org/paper/21483 (questioning the
effectiveness of DHS spending and concluding that a large portion of homeland security-spending
decisions are "made on a political basis rather than on a sound cost benefit analysis," leading to the
traditional public choice failures that plague government spending).
235. Bruce Ackerman, Terrorism and the ConstitutionalOrder, Keynote Address at the Fordham
Law Review Symposium: A New Constitutional Order? (Mar. 24, 2oo6), in 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 475,

475 (2oo6) ("A downward cycle threatens: After each successful attack, politicians will come up with a
new raft of repressive laws that ease our anxiety by promising greater security-only to find that a
different terrorist band manages to strike a few years later.... Even if the next half-century sees only
three or four attacks on a scale that dwarfs September iI, the pathological political cycle will prove
devastating to civil liberties by 2050.").
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ever-growing share of power and money if they are not held to objective

standards of accountability.23 6
Fusion center advocates insist that, whatever the costs of discrete
troubling incidents, or the general (and hard-to-quantify) erosion of
privacy that fusion centers generate, they must be weighed against the
immense benefits of stopping a terrorist attack. Citizens are terrified of
the prospect of poisoning by chemical agents, bombs in large buildings,
or a long shutdown of the electrical grid.' The fusion center concept is
supposed to respond to all these issues, as well as more quotidian fears of
crime.
But behavioral economists have developed strong objections to
justifying terror funding based on repeated references to low-probability
but catastrophic events. Due to the "availability bias," individuals are far
more likely to worry about spectacular, memorable threat scenarios
(such as a bomb on a plane) than the type of everyday scenarios that are
much more likely to harm or kill them (such as a car crash).' To
circumvent such biases, fusion centers' focus must be determined by
something more objective than whatever funding deals can be struck
with state and local entities or private sector partners.239
Presently, funding and support for fusion centers derives from
messy political compromises between congressional appropriators. To
the extent that the DHS has autonomy over its decisionmaking regarding
anti-terror funding, the simplicity of its approach has come under fire.24 o
Indeed, the DHS Office of Inspector General has seriously questioned
the DHS's reliance on states' own estimates of "terror targets" within
their borders.24 ' It criticized the DHS's use of the National Asset
236. Douthat, supra note 234.
237. RICHARD A. FALKENRATH ET AL., AMERICA'S ACHILLES' HEEL: NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND
CHEMICAL TERRORISM AND COVERT ATrACK 5 (1998) ("A single nuclear weapon could easily kill over a
hundred thousand people if detonated in a densely populated urban area.").
238. See generally DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR
DECISIONS (2oo8) (describing behavioral economics research on skewed threat assessments). As a
recent profile of Cass Sunstein mentioned, there is great "difficulty in estimating the possibility of
catastrophe-studies of insurance markets have found that we tend to ignore small risks until their
probability passes a certain threshold, at which point we overspend wildly to prevent them." Benjamin
Wallace-Wells, Cass Sunstein Wants to Nudge Us, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2010, (Magazine), at 42.
239. The recent implementation of "Virtual Alabama" provides an example of mission
opportunism. As Torin Monahan explains,
Virtual Alabama is a complex database replete with three-dimensional imagery of most of
the state.... [A]t first DHS had a very difficult time convincing local sheriffs that they
should participate and share their data. This obstacle was overcome, however, when DHS
promised to include a GIS overlay for all registered sex offenders in the state, showing
exactly where each of them are supposed to be residing.
MONAHAN, supra note 154, at 46.
240. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
DEVELOPING THE NATIONAL ASSET DATABASE 6, 8-15 (2oo6).

OIG-o6-4o, PROGRESS IN

241. Eric Lipton, Come One, Come All, Join the Terror Target List, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2oo6, at
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Database, which determined that Indiana "had 50 percent more listed
[terror targets] than New York ... and more than twice as many as
California," and thus ranked Indiana as "the most target-rich place in the
nation."242 Clearly, the process of allocating anti-terror funding to states
can and must be improved.
How should we measure the costs and benefits of the fusion center
apparatus? Judge Richard Posner has offered an objective framework for
assessing the value of anti-terrorism efforts. Under Posner's framework,
decisionmakers must assign relative probabilities and "cost estimates" to
various terror scenarios in order to extrapolate a proper amount of
spending.243 Posner's cost-benefit analysis aspires to provide a clear
economic rationale for an apparatus that is hard-pressed to "prove a
negative"-to demonstrate that its work prevented a given catastrophic
attack, particularly if it disrupts terror planning in its earliest stages.2"
Posner's approach calls for a U.S. agency that integrates "local
police and other information gatherers into a comprehensive national
intelligence network" just as Britain's MI-5 has done.245 Recognizing that
such integration will consume resources and require ongoing, costly
monitoring, Posner develops a threat theory designed to calibrate the
costs involved to the potential benefits, or nonharms.24 6 Using the case of
the terrorist attack on the subway, Posner engages in some preliminary
calculations and concludes that "if (at a guess) the annual probability of
such an attack is .0002 (1 in 5000) and the cost to society if the attack
occurred would be $ioo billion in the year of the attack, then the annual
expected loss is .0002 x $Ioo billion = $20 million." 2 47
Posner's method is designed to respond to complaints of those who
see threats to security as a continuum-and who worry that more
immediate threats like long-term unemployment, energy scarcity, and
As.
242.

Id.

243. RICHARD A. POSNER, COUNTERING TERRORISM: BLURRED Focus, HALTING STEPS 2-3 (2007); see
also Samuel J. Rascoff, Domesticating Intelligence, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 575, 619 (2010) ("[I]ntelligence

has thus far remained impervious to rationality review, including in the narrow sense of comparing
monetized costs and benefits.... Employing rationality review as a standard tool for proposed
intelligence programs would represent an important development in the governance of intelligence in
a number of respects.").
244. POSNER, supra note 243, at 2; see also Marcus Holmes, Just How Much Does That Cost,
Anyway? An Analysis of the Financial Costs and Benefits of the "No-Fly" List, HOMELAND SECURITY
AFF. (Jan. 2009), http://www.hsaj.org/?article=5.i.6.
245. POSNER, supra note 243, at 155-56 (calling for the creation of a new agency).
246. Id. at 216.
247. Id. Posner does recognize that work in the field acknowledges the "complexity of the required
analysis." Id. at 217 n.Ii. But see NICHOLAS NASSIM TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE
HIGHLY IMPROBABLE 74-75 (2007) (arguing that the exact likelihood of very low-probability events
cannot be estimated); Clifford Geertz, Very Bad News, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 24, 2005, at 4
(reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE (2004) and concluding that
Posner's method is too susceptible to manipulation to be reliable).
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inadequate access to childcare are causing far more misery than terror
events that still exist in the realm of speculation.24 Posner's cost-benefit
analysis is an effort to remove the threat of terror from the deeply
contested realms of emotion and politics to a more "rational"
approach.2 49 He urges assimilating homeland security expenditurespresumably including those for fusion centers-to the realm of risk
rendered legible by cost-benefit analysis.25 o
Of course, civil liberties are priceless, and do not fit into any
standard cost-benefit analysis."' But Posner's proposal obliquely protects
them by requiring that the growing domestic intelligence apparatus
provide some account of its value. In an era when fiscal impact estimates
from the Congressional Budget Office and the Office of Management
and Budget can make or break social policy proposals, the domestic
intelligence apparatus demands the same level of scrutiny and
accountability.
V. INSTITUTIONALIZING NETWORK ACCOUNTABILITY
Security experts have begun to bridge the gap between the privacy
and intelligence communities. The theme of their attempted
reconciliation of the security-privacy divide might be abbreviated as
accountability: the need for government openness to ensure some checks
on its conduct."' The most compelling suggestions for improving fusion
centers' respect for civil liberties and general effectiveness draw on
proposals from professionals who daily confront the challenge of
maintaining and improving information systems.
Fusion centers must become more serious about eliminating
inaccurate and irrelevant data from their databases, and preventing
surveillance of innocent individuals. Inaccurate data does nothing to
advance security, and spying on innocents distracts from the primary
mission of fusion centers. There are both substantive and procedural
248. See Jessica Stern & Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution Against Terrorism, in
STRATEGIC SURPRISE: LESSONS FROM RISK MANAGEMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT

MANAGING

IIO-83 (Paul Bracken et

al. eds., 2oo8).
249. POSNER, supra note 243, at 2 ("Rational analysis has the general form of cost-benefit

analysis.").
250. Id. at 2-3.
251. FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING
8 (2004) ("The basic problem with narrow economic analysis of health

AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING

and environmental protection is that human life, health, and nature cannot be described meaningfully
in monetary terms; they are priceless.").
252. Balkin, supra note 156, at 15 (describing the emergence of a "National Surveillance State,"
which could easily lead government to "create a parallel track of preventative law enforcement" that
avoids the "traditional guarantees of the Bill of Rights"). For an especially insightful analysis of the
rule of law problems raised by the transparency of personal information posted online, see Joel R.
Reidenberg, Transparent Citizens and the Rule of Law (Feb. I, 20o), http://cyber.law.harvard.edul
eventS/20o/o2/reidenberg.
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methods of refocusing scarce law enforcement resources on genuine
threats.
We also believe that there are many lessons from past interagency
collaborations that should guide the development of fusion centers. We
present these positive lessons as "network accountability": a governmental
commitment that not only agencies, but also networks of agencies, will be
held responsible for their actions. A new type of executive accountability
is necessary, because the legislative and judicial branches have
repeatedly failed to scrutinize the new domestic intelligence apparatus.
A.

CONGRESS AND THE COURTS: ILL-EQUIPPED TO ENSURE AccoUNTABILITY

The issues dealt with by fusion centers are at the forefront of larger
concerns about the increasing size, complexity, and pace of threats facing
the modern state. Terrorism provides a paradigmatic case for exceptional
authority in the executive branch. Concerns about terrorism help explain
why fusion center advocates view once-sacrosanct divisions -between
the military and law enforcement, and between foreign intelligence and
domestic investigations -as anathema.
The exceptionalist view contends that the threats facing us have
escalated dramatically: Technological advances guarantee greater access
to more and more dangerous chemicals and weapons. William
Scheuerman has underscored the importance of rapid and flexible
253
administration for our "distinctly high-speed society."' The Bush
administration used the rhetoric of speed to justify extraordinary
254
departures from past law enforcement practices.
Exceptionalist thinking is rooted in the political theory of Carl
Schmitt, who posed emergency as a foundational obstacle to an unfailing
commitment to the rule of law."' Schmitt's theory contends that
"[e]mergencies cannot realistically be governed by ex ante, highly
specified rules, but at most by vague ex post standards.""' He reasons
that lawmakers are ill-equipped to specify and allocate emergency
powers for all future contingencies, and even if they could do so, ex ante

253. WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE SOCIAL ACCELERATION OF TIME 4
(2oo4) (citing the social theory of Zygmunt Bauman, Manuel Castells, Anthony Giddens, David
Harvey, and Reinhardt Koselleck on the "social acceleration of time").
254. Wartime Executive Power and the National Security Agency's Surveillance Authority: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, lo9th Cong. II (2oo6) (statement of Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S.
Att'y Gen.) ("[S]peed, agility and secrecy are essential to... [the terrorist surveillance program's]
success.").
255. Until 9/I, the concept of "emergency" or "exception" had been a neglected topic in
American constitutional law. Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises
Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. ioli, 1015 n.8 (2003); see also e.g., PAUL BREST ET AL.,
PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES & MATERIALS 378-97 (4th ed. 2000) (discussing

World War I and the First Amendment cases).
256. Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARv. L. REV. 1095, 1101 (2009).
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rules risk "lashing the executive too tightly to the mast in future
emergencies."' The idea here is that the state must be as flexible-and
ruthless-as its enemies if it is to properly defend against them. Thus, the
public should accept diminished liberty as a trade-off for security in times
of crisis and should expect far greater protection of liberty interests in
times of peace. American constitutional law has recognized these
exceptions in a series of wartime cases.25 8

Is carte blanche executive discretion defensible on these groundsthat we live in exceptional times, demanding certain trade-offs to ensure
our safety? Were the adoption of extraordinary measures only to occur
in times of "existential threat" to the nation, they, of course, might be
justifiable. In the immediate, traumatic impact of an attack, popular
pressure for an immediate, unchecked response to terror will be
overwhelming.
However, recent work on the history of emergencies indicates that,
far from being a temporary divergence from a background of normality,
the rhetoric of emergency has regularly punctuated recent national
discussions of both internal and external threats to order and security. In
short, threat rhetoric has burrowed so deep into the fabric of our society
that it may be impossible to dislodge.
Kim Lane Scheppele's work on emergencies explores the expansion
of "emergency" conditions from temporary deviation to norm.2 5 Up until
the late 1940s, exceptional authorities were time-bound.' The Cold War,
however, ushered in a new type of exception, "an era of 'permanent
emergency"' in which sacrifices of constitutional rights were not clearly
temporary or reversible."' After a brief respite in the 199os, the second
Bush administration intensified the trend toward exception, which has
not yet abated.26 2 Scheppele believes that "Americans, beaten down in
their constitutional expectations by the permanent changes brought
about during the Cold War, have become used to the logic of the
exception. ,263

257. Id.

258. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 221 (1944); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
2, 4
(1866).
259. Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations
of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001 (2004).
260. Id. at 1oz5 ("[Crises in] World War I, the Great Depression, and World War II... had been
imagined to be of limited duration. While they were accompanied by a serious catalogue of
constitutional violations, such violations were eventually condemned as being excesses of a particular
time, not affecting America's normal constitutional operation or its constitutional aspirations.").
261. Id.
262. Id. at loo3. According to Scheppele, the "greater abuses have come as 9/11 recedes and
executive policy has turned toward larger and larger constitutional exceptions, with the active
acquiescence so far of both Congress and the courts." Id.

263. Id. at lo69.
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The paradoxical persistence of "permanent emergency" allows
promoters of the new domestic intelligence apparatus to characterize the
fusion centers as both an ordinary aspect of law enforcement and a vital
deterrent against existential threats. 4 This rhetoric takes advantage of a
further paradox of administrative law: Agency action is least reviewable
at what might be termed the "highest" and the "lowest" levels of
governance-when the government is conducting foreign affairs and
national defense (in the realm of high politics), and when it is engaged in
minor activities that most judges find too trivial to review."' Courts are
likely to find data mining of metadata related to individuals' phone calls
or credit card bills too trivial to challenge, and those few who do
challenge such data mining will find their actions characterized as
"meddling" in vital national security issues.' Fusion centers operate at
the intersection of "high" and "low" concerns, simultaneously too
important and too trivial to require judicial review, and are poised to
exploit either characterization of their activity whenever it is most
convenient.
Admittedly, there will always be disputes about the degree to which
agencies respect statutes or constitutional rights, and not all of them can
be settled in a court of law. Adrian Vermeule argues that "any project of
subjecting the administrative state to full legality is doomed to fail" in the
U.S. 26 Under Vermeule's theory, "institutional features . .. central to our
administrative law .. . create the preconditions for the emergence of the
legal black holes and legal grey holes that are integral to its structure."2
A legal black hole involves a situation where the law "either explicitly
exempts the executive from the requirements of the rule of law or
explicitly excludes judicial review of executive action."'6 A grey hole
presents "the fagade or form of the rule of law rather than any
substantive protections.,2, While domestic intelligence policy may seem
an ideal area for affording discretion to the executive, a critical mass of
evidence suggests that this discretion has gone too far.

264. For example, the Bush administration's 2002 National Security Strategy preamble warned
that "[t]he war against terrorists ... is a global enterprise of uncertain duration." WHITE HOUSE, THE
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

111(2002).

265. Vermeule, supra note 256, at I133.
266. Id. ("Nor do judges of any party or ideological bent want to extend legality [too] far, partly
because they fear the responsibility of doing so, partly because they understand the limits of their own
competence and fear that uninformed judicial meddling with the executive will have harmful
consequences where national security is at stake, and partly because it has simply never been done
before.").
267. Id. at 1104 n-33.
268. Id. at iot.
269. DAVID DYZENHAUs, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY 3 (2oo6).
270. Id.
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Evidence of "black" and "grey" holes emerges in cases involving the
potential revelation of law enforcement practices. In litigation involving
police surveillance of protesters at the 2004 Republican National
Convention, the Second Circuit evaluated whether the law enforcement
privilege should give way to a party's need for discovery.2 "' The court
refused to sanction the discovery of the officers' field reports, even in a
redacted form, because they would reveal information about undercover
operations and thus potentially hinder future ones.2 72 The court reasoned
that "[p]ulling any individual 'thread' of an undercover operation may
unravel the entire 'fabric' that could lead to identifying an undercover
officer."27 3

The Second Circuit's reasoning recalls the mosaic doctrine, which
has repeatedly prevented litigants from discovering key information held
by intelligence and military authorities.274 The mosaic doctrine significantly
limits fact-finding, because it counsels judicial deference in the face of an
agency assertion that "apparently harmless pieces of information when
assembled together could reveal a damaging picture."' One appellate
panel reasoned that, "given judges' relative lack of expertise regarding
national security and their inability to see the mosaic, we should not
entrust to them the decision whether an isolated fact is sensitive enough
to warrant" remedial action.276
Regardless of whether the mosaic doctrine is widely adopted, the
vastness of the contemporary domestic intelligence apparatus renders the
judiciary incapable of reviewing the vast majority of the situations in
which it makes decisions. As Hannah Arendt might put it, it is a "blob"
on autopilot, immune to the resistance of those it engulfs."
271. In re City of N.Y., 6o7 F.3d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 201o). The federal Freedom of Information Act,
or FOIA, exempts "records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes" if disclosure may
harm law enforcement activities or the public interest generally. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)( 7 ) (2oo6).
272. In re City of N.Y., 6o7 F.3 d at 944.
273. Id.

274. David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information Act,
115 YALE L.J. 628, 631 (2oo5).
275. 32 C.F.R. § 701.31 (2010). Pozen has argued that

[w]hen courts permit the government to withhold even the most innocuous-seeming (and
politically controversial) items of information without specifying how each item might
contribute to a dangerous mosaic, they enable spurious claims and disable counterargument.
Understanding this, agencies gravitate to the mosaic theory when they know their case for
secrecy is weak.
David Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, HARTFORD CouRANT (Feb. 28, 2oo6), http://articles.courant.com/
2oo6-02-28/newslo6o228oI43_I-patriot-act-national-security-agency-information-security-oversightoffice.
276. N.J. Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 3o8 F-3d 198, 219 (3d Cir. 2002).
277. See HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE ATTACK OF THE BLOB: HANNAH ARENDT AND THE CONCEPT
OF THE SOCIAL 6-7 (1998) ("The real-world problem that Arendt intended her concept of the social to
address... concerns the gap between our enormous, still-increasing powers and our apparent
helplessness to avert the various disasters-national, regional, and global-looming on our horizon.").
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The informality and secrecy surrounding fusion center operations
also helps prevent any "critical mass" of decisions accumulating to the
point where it could be questioned. Even if critical mass were achieved,
challenges to a fusion center's activities would surely evoke deference
from judges fearful of tipping government's hand to terrorists.
It might seem that courts would feel more comfortable about
scrutinizing surveillance decisions akin to the type that normally require
warrants. However, it is easy to anticipate the government's response to
such an attempt at disentanglement: Even identifying which investigations
dealt with national security and which dealt with regular criminal matters
might serve to expose critical personnel or otherwise to reveal "law
enforcement techniques and procedures.""8 With only a few notable
exceptions,"' courts have been wary of exposing any secrets that would
undermine the effectiveness of national defense.2'
By making the fusion process an interagency collaboration rather
than the province of a whole new entity, fusion center architects have
avoided certain basic requirements of notice-and-comment rulemaking
and publicity surrounding adjudications. Those officials accessing fusion
centers can avoid creating permanent files that might be implicated by
the Privacy Act.8 '' The informality and secrecy surrounding fusion
centers helps prevent individuals from amassing enough information and
data to challenge the networked agencies' actions in court. Even if those
troubled by this activity manage to challenge it in court, they still must
face the "grey holes" inherent in exercise of "soft look" review, the
prevalence of "good cause" exceptions, and Chevron deference.2'
Invocations of national defense can evoke a Pavlovian deference from
judges conditioned to defer to the executive on nearly all matters
deemed vital to "national security."

278. In re City of N.Y., 6o7 F.3d at 944.
279. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.713, 714 (1971) (permitting newspapers to

publish then-classified material, popularly known as the "Pentagon Papers.").
280. Courts are particularly cautious about unearthing the "deep secrets" that may be at the core
of a nation's national security strategy. See, e.g., David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257,
260 (200) ("Sometimes, outside parties are aware that a secret exists even though they are ignorant of
its content.... [This is] a shallow secret. Other times, outside parties are unaware of a secret's
existence; they are in the dark about the fact that they are being kept in the dark.... [This is] a deep
secret.").
281. GERMAN & STANLEY, supra note 27, at Io ("Some states, for example, have much stronger
privacy or open-records laws than the federal government, while in other states they are weaker.
Fusion centers can manipulate who 'owns' the records, or where they are 'held' to thwart public
oversight.").
282. See supra text accompanying notes 266-270.

283. See, e.g., David Kravets, Courts, Congress Shun Addressing Legality of Warrantless
Eavesdropping,WmED (Jan. 29, 2oio), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2oo/ollegality-of-warrantlesseavesdropping/.
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NETWORK ACCOUNTABILITY VIA INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

Unfortunately, neither new legislation nor judicial interventions are
likely to be effective at ensuring that fusion centers are meaningfully
accountable to an appropriate range of stakeholders. Both have tended
to provide a patina of rationality and legal regularity without
concomitant substance.24 We call for network accountability that would
empower watchdogs closest to the actual operation of the fusion center
apparatus to improve its operation.
There are two foundations for network accountability: first, a
plausible definition of success and failure from fusion center architects so
that funding can be based on performance, and second, a willingness of
nodes in the fusion network to undergo independent audits from other
network entities to assure objective assessments." Without verifiable
benchmarks for performance, we risk descending into a "new normal,"
where spending is unchecked and privacy and civil liberty erosions
become de rigueur.
In order to advance a theory of network accountability, it is helpful
to characterize on an abstract level how fusion centers have heretofore
avoided classic models of administrative accountability. Once we have
clarified the concept of regulatory arbitrage, extant models of
coordinating and improving interagency action can be more readily
applied as ways of institutionalizing the substantive and procedural
changes-ranging from immutable audit logs to redress mechanisms to
more rigorous cost-benefit analysis -that we proposed above.
Fusion centers raise particular concerns about accountability,
because their activities, consisting of collaborations between
governmental units, create repeated opportunities for regulatory arbitrage:
the shifting of activity to the least stringent regulatory regime.
Regulatory arbitrage occurs when an entity reclassifies, relocates, or
slightly alters its activity in order to avoid legal scrutiny traditionally
associated with that activity. 86

We believe there are at least two different types of regulatory
arbitrage: (i) formalistic recharacterization, which occurs when entities
at the boundary between regulation and non-regulation slightly alter or
rename their activities in order to avoid regulation, and (2) jurisdiction

284. Vermeule endorses this situation, since he believes that "hypocritical lip-service to the rule of
law may even be best for the (thick) rule of law in the long run." Vermeule, supra note 256, at 1132.
285. The existing Civil Liberties Assessment for the State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center
Initiative performed by the DHS offers vague promises of compliance with little detail about
execution. See CIVIL LIBERTIES IMPAcT ASSESSMENT, supra note 35.
286. Frank Partnoy, FinancialDerivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage,22 J. CoRP. L. 211,
227 (1997) (defining regulatory arbitrage in the financial sector as "transactions designed specifically
to reduce costs or capture profit opportunities created by differential regulations or laws").
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shopping, when entities switch the location of their activity to avoid more
stringent regulatory regimes.
arbitrage - formalistic
regulatory
of
form
first
The
recharacterization-arises out of longstanding problems of common law
interpretation and statutory drafting. If a regulation bans conduct or
renders it burdensome to undertake, an entity can slightly alter its
practices so that the regulation no longer covers it. For example, if a
certain drug is banned, a drug seller may slightly alter the pills it sells so
that it technically no longer falls under the definition of a controlled
substance. Thus, the core of the practice persists, yet the law fails to
reach it.
In the finance field, attorneys characterized credit default swaps as
"protection buying" and "protection selling" rather than insurance7 or
gambling, thus evading capital requirements (in the case of insurance
law) or the outright bans that might apply to gambling.'m While the
transactions were essentially identical to traditional insurance-where
the buyer had an insurable interest in the entity whose default it was
protecting against-or gambling-where there was no such insurable

interest and a "naked credit default swap" was arranged-their legal
characterizations allowed large financial institutions to sidestep
traditional regulatory limits on risky transactions.289
Jurisdiction shopping also extrapolates a familiar legal conceptforum shopping-to the regulatory realm. When regulations in one
jurisdiction make an activity less subject to scrutiny or checks as
compared to another jurisdiction's laws, those pursuing it can move the
activity to the least restrictive location. Corporate and tax law literatures

287. William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout,66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 987-88 (2oo9) ("The
basic definition of insurance is '[a] contract by which one party (the insurer) undertakes to indemnify
another party (the insured) against risk of loss, damage, or liability arising from the occurrence of
some specified contingency.' A CDS [credit default swap] certainly appears to fall within this
definition given that the protection seller contractually agrees to compensate the protection buyer
following the occurrence of a credit event. Notwithstanding their insurance-like characteristics, CDSs
generally have not been considered insurance for purposes of state insurance regulations and,
therefore, have not been subject to these regulations." (first alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)
(quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 870 ( 9 th ed. 2oo9)).
288. Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of the Securities and Exchange Commission as a Market
Regulator, 78 U. CIN. L. REv. 501, 524 (2010) ("Credit derivatives operate functionally as short sales of
bonds with virtually unlimited risks. This is because the buyer of a credit default swap does not have to own
the bond or any other debt instrument upon which such a contract is based. So buyers can purchase a 'naked
short' on the debt of companies without any restrictions.... The head of the New York State Insurance
Department called credit derivatives 'legalized gambling."' (footnotes omitted) (quoting Shannon D.
Harrington, DTCC May Raise Credit-DefaultSwap DisclosureAmid Criticism, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 31,
2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ailF5ibQBk9w&refer=home)).
289. Knoll, supra note 183, at 94; see also Frank Pasquale, Deregulatory Fundamentalismat OCC,
OTS, and SCOTUS, CONCURRING OPINIoNs (Oct. 15, 2oo8,9:13 PM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/

archives/2oo8/io/deregulatoryfu.html (describing the financial institutions' ability to choose the least
restrictive regulator of risky activities).
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on the "race to the bottom" (or "race to the top") explore such
developments in detail." Defenders of jurisdiction shopping praise the
flexibility it affords corporations, while its detractors complain that the
practice erodes corporate commitment to public values.
The concept of regulatory arbitrage arose in the private law
literature, describing the maneuvers of firms attempting to evade or
avoid regulation."' But arbitrageurs are not confined to the private
sector, and they thrive in the murky realm of domestic intelligence and
counterterrorism. In a classic example of jurisdictional arbitrage, the
Department of Defense located many detainees in the War on Terror at
Guantanamo Bay, which it viewed as a legal "no man's land" where
neither American law nor any other country's law was supposed to
apply."' The sublimation of layers of federal law enforcement bureaucracy
into a seamless web of virtual information sharing has enabled the
formalistic recharacterizations of intelligence gathering we explored in
Part III.B.i above.
We believe that the problems of regulatory arbitrage complicate the
adoption of our proposed substantive reforms. If immutable audit logs
and redress mechanisms are to find a permanent foothold in fusion
centers, they cannot be left to diffuse through the domestic intelligence
apparatus on the basis of vague guidance documents in the manner the
DHS suggests.293 Objective cost-benefit analysis is also hard to come by in
an increasingly careerist bureaucracy.29
What institutions will get the job done? We believe that different
paths will need to be taken for procedural privacy protections, such as
290. See, e.g., Tracy A. Kaye, The Gentle Art of CorporateSeduction: Tax Incentives in the United
States and the European Union, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 93, 117 (2oo8) ("By fostering a 'race to the bottom'
in which states must continually increase tax incentives in order to lure businesses, tax competition
undermines the ability of state and local government to finance the investments in public education
and infrastructure that provide the foundation for future economic growth.").
291. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
292. Installation of Slot Mach. on U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, 6 Op. O.L.C. 236, 238 (1982)
(finding that the station at Guantanamo is not a "possession" of the United States); Customs DutiesGoods Brought into U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 35 Op. Att'y Gen. 536, 537 (929)
(analyzing Guantanamo's status in the context of a review of other military bases); JANE MAYER, THE
DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF How THE WAR ON TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS
139 (2oo8) (describing "black sites"); Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1197,
1197 (1996); Johan Steyn, GuantanamoBay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 INT'L &COMP. L.Q. 1, (2oo4).
293. The DHS has dismissed concerns about regulatory arbitrage, noting that fusion centers would
adopt written privacy policies that "should be consistent with the guidance issued by the PM-ISE, and
to the extent possible clearly delineate authorities for each fusion center participant to eliminate the
potential for 'policy shopping' raised by one critic." PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 27.
294. PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY 5 (2oo7) ("Political officials, who are appointed
for short periods and enter service through the famous revolving door, sometimes utilize outsourcing
both as a means of getting results and as a way of preserving later career opportunities. Homeland
Security seems to be the paradigm case.... More than two-thirds of the Department's most senior
executives ... have moved to private positions, some with companies who receive lucrative contracts
from the agency.").
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immutable audit logs and redress mechanisms, and more substantive
evaluations of the efficacy of fusion centers as a whole. An independent
board of experts, with little or no investment in any particular methods
of domestic intelligence gathering, should be charged with performing a
broad cost-benefit analysis of the ISE, including fusion centers.
By contrast, fusion centers themselves will need to "take
ownership" of procedural privacy protections if they are to have any
chance of succeeding. Recent innovations in finance and critical
infrastructure regulation suggest some promising methods of
institutionalizing these commitments via an interagency coordinating
council.
C.

TOWARD A CIVIL LIBERTIES PROTECTION BOARD

At a 2007 House Intelligence Committee meeting on the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, the Director of National Intelligence,
Michael McConnell, stated that the intelligence business "is conducted in
secret for a reason-you compromise sources and methods" when they
are open to public examination.' Yet the secrecy and obfuscation
surrounding fusion centers -one critical part of an ongoing integration of
intelligence and law enforcement-are menaces to American traditions
of government accountability. Given the failures of Congress and the
courts detailed in Part V.A, we propose executive reforms to address the
problem.
Other legal scholars have recognized the importance of oversight for
the extraordinary measures adopted in response to 9/11. Philip B.
Heymann and Juliette Kayyem have argued that an independent
advisory board should "investigate matters that have public import in the
intelligence area.""6 For Heymann and Kayyem, the President's
Intelligence Advisory Board ("PIAB") is a useful model.2" With
independent members, the PIAB has no direct interest in the programs it
295. SHORROCK, supra note 229, at 186 (quoting Michael McConnell, Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Of course, there are many reasons for state and DHS officials to
try to keep fusion center methods secret. Secrecy does not merely stop enemies-be they internal or
external-from foiling counterterror and counterintelligence strategies. It also prevents assessment of
the activities' value. See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 241.
296. PHILIP B. HEYMANN & JULIETTE N.

KAYYEM, PROTECTING LIBERTY IN AN AGE OF TERROR 112

(2oo5).

297. Id. ("[PIAB] is an entity that exists in order to provide the president with essential
information regarding intelligence and national security matters."). The board was known as the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) from May 4, 1961 to February 29, 2008.
when President George W. Bush renamed it the President's Intelligence Advisory Board. Exec. Order
No. 13,462, 73 Fed. Reg. 11,805 (Mar. 4, 2oo8) ("References in Executive Orders other than this order,
or in any other presidential guidance, to the 'President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board' shall be
deemed to be references to the President's Intelligence Advisory Board established by this order.").
The name change reflects the expanding focus of intelligence agencies to gather not only foreign, but
also domestic intelligence.
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reviews, and can offer independent advice. For Heymann and Kayyem,
our time of "massive legal change" demands a sober second look from a
board capable of examining it from a broader social perspective.299
We believe that a board like the one proposed by Heymann and
Kayyem would help implement proposals like Posner's comprehensive
cost-benefit analysis of the threat matrix. As a regulatory analogue to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC"), an independent
evaluative board could make recommendations based on privileged
access to security analyses." The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
("FISA")o' permits certain judges on the FISC to be privy to a range of
classified materials normally inaccessible to courts.302 Once vetted for
top-secret national security clearances, members of the panel could
attain a comprehensive view of the domestic intelligence apparatus.3" 3
Given recent revelations about the size and redundancy of the U.S.
anti-terror apparatus, even intelligence community stalwarts may be
ready to concede that independent analysis of programs is crucial.30 4
President Obama's nominee for Director of National Intelligence,
former Lt. General James R. Clapper, has "appeared to endorse a
proposal by Sen. Olympia J. Snowe . .. for an inspector general who

298. Exec. Order No. 12,863, 3 C.F.R. 632 (993); Exec. Order No. 12,334, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,955
(1981); David Everett Colton, Comment, Speaking Truth to Power: Intelligence Oversight in an
Imperfect World, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 571, 6ii, n.177. ("The PFIAB is composed of prominent citizens

who serve at the pleasure of the President. The PFIAB is charged with monitoring the performance,
organizations, personnel, collection, or evaluation of intelligence within the intelligence community.").
Colton complained that, during the 1980s, "The PFIAB is sadly lacking in power and prestige." Id.
However, a more recent assessment has been more positive. Kenneth Michael Absher et al., Getting
on Board: How an Obscure Panel Could Fix the U.S. Intelligence Community, FOREIGN AFF. (Sept. 17,
2009), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/6 5 4 15 ("The PIAB is a unique presidential asset that, if
properly employed, could help identify and meet the intelligence challenges that future presidents will
face.").
299. HEYMANN & KAYYEM, supra note 296, at I13. Some commentators go further, arguing that the

data mining issue demands an "independent privacy agency." Francesca Bignami, European Versus
American Liberty: A ComparativePrivacy Analysis of Antiterrorism Data Mining, 48 B.C. L. REV. 609,
696-97 (2oo7).
300. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court is a secret court that consists of eleven district

court judges, at least three of whom must live within twenty miles of the District of Columbia. See
50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (Supp. III 2009).
301. Pub L. No. 95-511,92 Stat 1783 (codified in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C. (2oo6)).
302. Daniel J. Malooly, Physical Searches Under FISA: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 35 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 411, 413-14 (1998).

303. This would not be an insurmountable barrier to participation since an "estimated 854,000
people ... hold top-secret security clearances." Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, A Hidden World,
Growing Beyond Control,WASH. PosT, July 19, 20o, at Ai.
304. Id.("The top-secret world the government created in response to the terrorist attacks of Sept.
II, 2001, has become so large, so unwieldy and so secretive that no one knows how much money it

costs, how many people it employs, how many programs exist within it or exactly how many agencies
do the same work."). Priest and Arkin's series "Top Secret America" has been a cause cl6bre,
sparking widespread discussions across the political spectrum on how to promote government
accountability in an increasingly opaque counterterrorism environment. Id.
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could cover the entire intelligence community and help to identify
duplication and waste."30 5 In an era of fiscal anxiety and austerity,
domestic intelligence spending deserves to be scrutinized as rigorously as
any other form of government spending.
While Heymann and Kayyem's 2005 proposal for an independent
board outside of government would be a valuable way of providing fresh
perspective on the overall cost-effectiveness of fusion centers, civil
liberties concerns demand a more formal response. Interagency
collaborations in the fusion center context have been "governed," if at
all, by ad hoc agreements with limited legal effect.3" Such agreements
would not adequately diffuse the immutable audit logs and redress
mechanisms we have proposed.
Interagency cooperation is an undertheorized concept in
administrative law. 3" It has become a pressing topic as rapidly shifting
and expanding risks have reduced the capability of any single agency to
act effectively on its own.
Recent presidents have confronted a familiar pattern. First,
executive leaders realize that existing agencies with overlapping
jurisdiction cannot alone solve a problem.3os Second, legislation (or
agency initiative) leads to collaborations between agencies. Third, the
shortcomings of the collaboration emerge, leading to criticism. Finally,
remedial action focuses on the substantive and institutional changes
necessary to avoid future failures.
The history of fusion centers tracks this cycle. In early 2002, the
Bush administration sought to facilitate cooperation amongst federal,
state, and local agencies whose longstanding isolation from one another
led to the intelligence failures of 9/11." Congress, in turn, passed laws
creating the networked apparatus of the ISE.3 0 Now, we enter the third
stage of this pattern as criticisms are leading to a rethinking of the fusion
center concept.
A more substantive guarantor of accountability is required. To flesh
out how that might be institutionalized, we look to another arena where
305. Editorial, The Overgrowth of Intelligence ProgramsSince Sept. 11, WASH. PosT, July 22, 2010,
at Ais (reporting Clapper's response to questions at his Senate confirmation hearing).
306. Homeland security managers have recognized the importance of improving interagency
relationships. See, e.g., Kenneth E. Christopher et al., Domestic FederalInteragency Planning:Meeting
a Homeland Security Need, 7() J. HOMELAND SECURITY & EMERGENCY MGMT. 20 (Apr. 2oo) at iI
(recommending "enhanced interagency planning capability").
307. The Administrative Procedure Act does not attempt to formalize interagency cooperation,
which is mainly accomplished via ad hoc Memoranda of Understanding and other informal modes of
cooperation. Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2327 (2oo6) (discussing overlapping agency authority).
308. See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Can Interagency Dialogue Serve as the New Separation of
Powers?, I16 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 131, 132 (2oo6) (discussing extant "multi-agency consultations").
309. See supra text accompanying notes 1-5.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 1-5.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

1490

[Vol. 62:I441

a critical mass of harms to individuals had disastrous consequences for
the nation as a whole: namely, the financial sector. Crisis-driven reform
of financial regulations has generated models of network accountability,
connecting the complaints of individuals to larger institutions of
oversight."'
Past remedial actions provide a guide to institutional reform here.
At first, interagency collaboration in the finance sector did not
adequately respond to challenges that emerged in the 199os. The 1993
Interagency Guidelines for Real Estate Lending Policies (the
"Guidelines") appeared in three sections of the Code of Federal
Regulations,"' and attempted to "prescribe [] real estate lending
standards that require each insured depository institution to adopt and
maintain comprehensive written real estate lending policies that are
consistent with safe and sound banking practices."3 13 Ostensibly updated
to reflect changing market conditions over time, the Guidelines did little
to stop the growth of exploitative and unsafe lending.3 14 Even worse,
particular deregulatory agencies-such as the Office of Thrift
Supervision and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currencyaffirmatively undermined state efforts to protect borrowers.3 5
During the debate over financial reform, many commentators
worried that consumer protection had been a neglected goal of bank
regulators whose primary goal was promoting credit and industry.3, 6 Like
civil liberties protections in the intelligence sphere, consumer protections
in the financial world were too often treated as a distraction from the
primary goals of regulators, rather than as a critical part of their
mission.3 17

311. See infra text accompanying notes 321-324.
312. 12
(2010).

C.F.R. Pt. 34, app. A to subpt. D

(2010); 12

C.F.R. pt. 208, app. C (2oo);

12

C.F.R. pt. 365

313. Real Estate Lending Standards, 57 Fed. Reg. 62,890, 62,890 (Dec. 31, 1992).
314. BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS 94 (2010) ("'[Gluidance' was only guidance, which lenders could adopt or ignore as
they saw fit, depending on how zealously the regulators enforced it. No antipredatory lending bill was
ever passed; no strictures against most of the practices were ever enforced; no serious effort was ever
made to make financial institutions pay more attention to the loans they were buying and
securitizing.").

315. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCCs Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency's Authority and
Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection,23 ANN. REV. BANKING
& FIN. L. 225, 226 (2oo4).

316. Elizabeth Warren, The Growing Threat to Middle Class Families, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 401, 402
(2oo4) [hereinafter Warren, Growing Threat]; Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, 5 DEMOCRACY: J.
IDEAS 8, 8-9 (2007) [hereinafter Warren, Unsafe].
317. Warren, Growing Threat, supra note 316; Warren, Unsafe, supra note 316; see also Robert
Gnaizda, Robert Gnaizda: My Crime Was Not Curbingthe Guilty, OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS (Jan. 6,2011),
http://www.opposingviews.com/ilrobert-gnaizda-my-crime-was-not-curbing-the-guilty ("In 1999 and in
2000, we met with Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan to criticize the Federal Reserve's laissez-faire
attitude toward the major subprime lenders, such as Ameriquest. We asked that Greenspan urge all
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As the financial crisis of 2008 unfolded, that attitude became
impossible to sustain. Practices that harmed borrowers contributed to a
larger economic crisis that threatened to initiate a chain reaction of
catastrophic consequences for the finance system.3'5 Legislators realized
that the regulatory arbitrage persistent in the financial sector-where the
Office of Thrift Supervision, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
and other regulators competed to offer the most lax regulatory regimeserved neither consumers nor the larger economy.' The recently
enacted Dodd-Frank Act32 o addresses both concerns by establishing a
Financial Stability Oversight Council ("FSOC") and creating the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB"), proposed by Harvard
Law School Professor Elizabeth Warren."' Each entity provides some
key lessons for future institutional designers.
The FSOC is a ten-member board chaired by the Secretary of the
Treasury and composed mainly of the heads of federal economic
agencies.322 Its purpose is "to identify risks to the financial stability of the
United States that could arise from the material financial distress or
failure" of large bank and nonbank financial companies.3 " The FSOC is
designed to short-circuit both forms of regulatory arbitrage discussed in
Section IV.B. Its inclusion of "non-bank" entities brings companies like
American International Group under the council's watch, better
enabling it "to respond to emerging threats to the stability of the United
States financial system."3 24 The FSOC offers a valuable example of
imposing some centralized authority and responsibility upon a dispersed
major financial institutions to set a fiduciary 'gold standard' that could effectively compete with and
possibly eliminate the unregulated subprime industry. The chairman refused. Stymied by both the
Clinton and Bush administrations' refusal to act, we failed to continue to protest publicly. A big
mistake. In 2004, we convened a meeting with the 15 largest financial institutions engaged in
adjustable-rate mortgages, including Countrywide, to urge that they substantially revise and raise their
standards due to the dangers of adjustable-rate mortgages, including option ARMs. Getting no
support, we met with Greenspan in July 2004 to specifically complain about these practices and used
Countrywide as a prime example. Greenspan stated that he had reviewed our documents and that,
even with a doctorate in math, you could not understand these mortgages. But he refused to do
anything.").
318. RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF 'o8 AND THE DESCENT INTO
DEPRESSION (2009); see also NICOLE GELINAS, AFTER THE FALL: SAVING CAPITALISM FROM WALL
WASHINGTON 150 (2009) (reporting that Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke
warned during the third week of September 2oo8 that "there will be no economy on Monday" if
STREET-AND

bailouts of key institutions were not arranged).
319. Wilmarth, supra note 315, at 228; see also Pasquale,supra note 289.
32o. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. II1-2o3,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
321. 12 U.S.C. § 5481.
322. Viral V. Acharya et al., Measuring Systemic Risk, in REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODDFRANK ACT AND THE NEw ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 87, 89-94 (Viral V. Acharya et al. eds.,
2011).
323. Dodd-Frank Act,

324. Id.

§ 112,

124 Stat. at 1398-98.
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regulatory environment. It is designed to discipline rogue entities that
have used regulatory arbitrage to violate the spirit (if not the letter) of
extant financial regulation.325
The CFPB offers other lessons about restoring values in agencies
that have long neglected them. The CFPB is an autonomous bureau
within the Federal Reserve Board tasked with promoting consumer
protection. ,6 While consumer protections were once considered ancillary
duties of a wide variety of agencies, the CFPB centralizes authority and
responsibility for protecting them.3 27 The CFPB will control rulemaking
and enforcement with respect to many previously enacted consumer
protection statutes."' It is one of the most popular and eagerly
anticipated dimensions of the recent financial reform legislation.
Failed efforts at risk regulation in the financial sector prior to DoddFrank sparked renewed legislative and agency emphasis on making sure
some entity is responsible for system-wide outcomes -ranging from the
prevention of financial crisis to ordinary consumer protection. We
believe that the ISE can learn from these efforts as it strives to make a
network of agencies respectful of civil liberties and effective at reducing
risk. Just as the CFPB established in the Dodd-Frank Act is designed to
coordinate and monitor multiple finance regulators' efforts to protect
consumers, a Civil Liberties Protection Board should be established to
assure some type of centralized accountability for the civil liberties
implications of the ISE.329
Presently, the duty to protect civil liberties protections is divided
between a central DHS office (CRCL) and "local accountability
systems."33 o Neither entity has been capable of accomplishing the mission
because of the unique challenges posed by agency interactions.33 , We
believe that a Civil Liberties Protection Board would institutionalize the
types of cooperation necessary to make civil liberties protections a higher
priority for the domestic intelligence apparatus. Staff from all
participants in the ISE would inform and disseminate the Board's work.
A Civil Liberties Protection Board representing all levels of the ISE

325. Acharya, supra note 322.
326. SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER, & FLOM LLP, CONSUMER PROTECTION PROVISIONS IN THE
DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECrION Acr I (2010).

327. F.J. Ornstein et al., Interagency Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending, 61 CONSUMER FIN.
L.Q. REP. 176, 178 (2oo7) (discussing state of the law prior to enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act).
328. SKADDEN LLP, supra note 326, at 4.
329. 12 U.S.C. § 5311 (2010) (describing the FSOC, also frequently referred to as the "Systemic
Risk Council").

330. Matthew C. Waxman, Police and National Security: American Local Law Enforcement and
CounterterrorismAfter9/11, 3 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 377, 396 (2009).
331. We have already explored challenges to CRCL in Part III.A. Waxman describes the way in
which federal "secrecy rules" have frustrated local accountability boards. Id. at 393-96.
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would provide a permanent institutional advocate for the types of
auditing technology and redress procedures we discussed above.
The DHS and the DOJ should be as committed to fostering
interagency cooperation in the enforcement of civil liberties as they are
to using interagency cooperation in combating crime and terror. Civil
rights infringements are not only hazardous to citizens, but also to the
larger intelligence mission: They divert valuable resources to phantom
threats. Recent initiatives in the critical information infrastructure and
finance sectors have provided valuable precedents for enacting such
reform. Moreover, given the President's inherent authority over security
matters, we believe that the reforms we propose could be implemented
by executive order.33 2 Such an executive order would send a muchneeded message to citizens: In a well-functioning state, security and
liberty are mutually reinforcing
CONCLUSION

In a speech at the Washington National Cathedral three days after
9/I,
then-President George W. Bush proclaimed that America's
"responsibility to history is already clear[:] ... [to] rid the world of evil." 333
For the next seven years, the Bush administration tried many innovations
to keep that promise, ranging from preemptive war in Iraq to the
changes in law enforcement and domestic intelligence that we have
explored in this Article. Fusion centers are a lasting legacy of the
Administration's aspiration to "eradicate evil," a great leap forward in
both technical capacity and institutional coordination. Their goal is to
eliminate both the cancer of terror and lesser diseases of the body politic.
Yet evidence has accumulated that the cure may be worse than the
disease. Even though the press, public, and advocacy groups have had
only limited access to their operations, several violations of civil rights
and liberties have been uncovered. Fusion centers are presently engaged
in regulatory arbitrage that threatens to permit future infringements of
civil liberties violations to remain undetected and to tilt the legal playing
field unfairly against watchdogs and accountability organizations.
Pervasive surveillance post-9/iI should not surprise anyone: the
executive branch often limits civil liberties in times of crisis and reverses
course in times of peace.3" In the past, other branches of government
balanced such actions by expressing concerns about individual rights

332. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 3, at 70.

333. George W. Bush, President of the U.S., Remarks at the National Day of Prayer and
Remembrance at Episcopal National Cathedral (Sept. 14, 2001), transcript available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010914-2.html.
334. Solove, supra note i8, at 350 (exploring the pendulum theory prevalent in national security
debates-namely, that civil liberties protections swing from high to low and back again based on
changing threat levels).
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once the imminent threat had subsided. Unfortunately, neither Congress
nor the courts have effectively confronted abuses in the ISE. We will
need to rely on new forms of network accountability to improve its
performance.
Fusion center reform requires recognition of some stark facts. In the
aftermath of the 9/II terror attacks, governments fundamentally
transformed the nature of domestic surveillance. The U.S. has channeled
hundreds of millions of dollars to states and cities to build fusion centers,
which mine public and private sector databases to detect "all hazards, all
crimes, all threats." Fusion centers are the leading edge of a quiet
movement now underfoot to develop a unified foreign and domestic
intelligence capability.
Fusion center proponents often insist that they produce valuable
intelligence, and that criticism of their work merely reflects a policy
preference for security over liberty. Their faith in technology -along
with an absence of meaningful institutional oversight-has prevented a
searching discussion of these arguments, which we have tried to initiate
with this Article. Although fusion centers contribute to the nation's
information-sharing efforts, inadequate oversight has had troubling
consequences. Fusion centers' sweeping data mining practices
compromise privacy, free association, and government accountability.
They can misdirect law enforcement officials, wasting scarce resources
investigating people erroneously included on threat lists. Lack of
accountability undermines both liberty and security.
Someone must "watch the watchers," especially when surveillance is
based not merely on a single agency database, but on a vast reservoir of
public and private data. Without immutable audit-enabling technology,
fusion centers will remain black boxes, preventing effective oversight.
They will pair ever more pervasive surveillance with aggressive
deflection of inquiries about it. A no-holds-barred assault on terror
cannot become the template for ordinary law enforcement without
seriously disrupting the balance of power between police and citizen,
government and governed. Network accountability would help restore
that balance, ensuring that a growing law enforcement apparatus is itself
respecting the law.

